

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

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GOVERNMENTAL Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR
02 January 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.: Ganging Up on the CIA

Concerning the current fuss about the Central Intelligence Agency, a few observations:

1. There was never a clearer distinction between what the lawyers call *malum prohibitum*, and *malum in se*. The former describes something you are not permitted under the law to do for reasons decided upon by the legislature, but not necessarily connected with questions of good or evil.

An example is stopping for a red light. If you are in the middle of a desert, and come to a cross road, and easily establish that there is absolutely no traffic coming in on the right, or on the left, you are nevertheless expected to stand motionless until the light turns green. But if you proceeded, absolutely confident that no one would be hurt by your doing so, you would be committing a *malum prohibitum*, for which the traffic cop hidden behind the Coca Cola sign could zoom up and give you a ticket. But no one could seriously accuse you of having risked anybody's life or limb.

By contrast, a *malum in se* would be crossing the light for the sake of a few seconds.

advantage notwithstanding that there were pedestrians and other cars exercising their right of way. What might then result is an accident; a death, even.

In all the thousands of words devoted to the accusations levelled by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times (Hersh discovered My Lai a few years ago), there is nowhere evident any substantive evil allegedly committed by the CIA. That is to say, everybody is saying: The CIA performed certain acts (bugging, infiltration, collecting data) that, under the law, should have been performed only by the FBI. Therefore let us have a complete investigation of the CIA, and so on.

It remains to be asked: if what the CIA allegedly did would have been legal if performed by the FBI, then shouldn't the furore be limited to the kind of furore appropriate to, say, the Department of Agriculture's doing something that really should have been done by the Department of the Interior?

2. Where are the broken bodies? Under the law, a

federal organization is entitled, under rigidly prescribed circumstances, to tap a telephone, or to infiltrate an organization. Question: where is the trail of palpably innocent people whose rights were trampled upon?

It used to somewhat disconcert the more inflamed critics of Sen. Joseph McCarthy that it was not possible instantly to point to the carnage caused by him in the State Department; that is, not all that many people were actually dismissed from their jobs during the dread reign of terror.

By the same token, I should hope that the accusers would come forth and show us not merely that the CIA had allegedly violated a legislative protocol, but that the CIA had interfered with the practical liberties of genuinely patriotic dissenters who had no ties whatever to any foreign government.

3. The answer is that it is largely an ideological fuss. The CIA is the hobgoblin of very little minds today. There are many reasons why this is

so, not least of them that there are many Americans, and many of them in positions of influence, who a) do not like America very much; and b) have no particular quarrel with America's enemies, or with those who practice a way of life alien to American traditions.

Frank Mankiewicz, principal adviser to Sen. George McGovern, can come back from Cuba and praise Fidel Castro for doing far less for Cuba than Adolf Hitler did for Germany.

Penthouse magazine, a journal substantially oriented for the kinky set, is taking out full-page ads on a CIA expose in which it is charged by the author that the current director of the CIA is better equipped to superintend Hitler's concentration camps than American security.

They are ganging up on the CIA: because they don't believe, many of them, that America ought to be in the business of defending people, here or abroad, from such blessings as Castro has brought to Cuba, or Mao Tse-tung to China.

WASHINGTON STAR
02 January 1975

~~Nic Gold~~

Tyranny of the Lawless

For alert civil libertarians, the headline story emerging from the last week of the old year which most affected the individual freedom of Americans wasn't that involving the Central Intelligence Agency. It was the news that once again—for the second time in 11 months—someone acting out a bizarre and potentially violent fantasy, on an impulse, had invaded the White House grounds.

No doubt New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh's story of alleged CIA domestic surveillance activities will be given priority attention by the Ford administration and several Capitol Hill committees in the months to come. And the cloak-and-dagger specter of an incipient CIA police state is sure to be raised, with renewed vigor, before various political and editorial audiences.

YET, DESPITE all the alarms we hear about government-inspired infringements on individual liberty, for most Americans any recent loss of rights and privileges we once took for granted hasn't resulted from an unwanted assertion of police authority. On the contrary, it has derived from a breakdown in respect for law and insti-

tutions, to the extent that the lawless are inspired to act upon impulses which, in another era, might have been restrained.

ITEM: There was a day in the not-too-distant past when an American citizen could go to an airport, buy a ticket and board a plane, with no more inconvenience suffered than that brought on by a slow-moving ticket agent.

No more. We've lost that freedom. Surrendered it, if not happily, at least willingly. A federal agency enforces new, restrictive regulations governing entry to commercial aircraft. Not because the agency sought or wanted that authority. Yet it has it. Why?

ITEM: Remember when a citizen who came to visit a senator or congressman in the Nation's Capital could enter a Capitol Hill office building without having to submit to a police inspection of a briefcase or purse?

No more. Oh, the inspecting officers are polite enough, and the examination

is cursory. But with that search, something undesirable, if necessary, has entered into the relationship between Americans and those who represent them in Washington.

Indeed, our most important public buildings—in certain metropolitan areas, even private buildings—are no longer places where free men and women can go about their business without search or interference. Why?

THE ANSWER to these questions has nothing to do with the CIA, the FBI or any other law enforcement authority's willful intrusion into our lives.

There are, you see, other tyrannies than those imposed by a police state. There is also the tyranny that comes to pass when some men act out their bizarre and potentially violent fantasies; to the end that in a country where once the White House lawn was open to the public there is now a need for an even more forbidding fence to separate the people's house and people's president from the people.

NEWSDAY
24 DEC 1974

The CIA Serves a Presidential Master

The CIA should be more accountable to Congress, an experienced journalist says, but if it has exceeded its authority, the President, not the agency, should be held responsible.

By Michael Dorman

The first time I visited CIA headquarters many years ago, I was so preoccupied with staring in every corner for a spy that I absent-mindedly put a lighted pipe in my topcoat pocket and forgot about it. Ten minutes later, while I was deeply engrossed in conversation with a CIA official, a young secretary poked her head in the door and said: "Mr. Dorman, I hate to interrupt you, but your coat is on fire."

Actually, only the pocket was on fire—but the blaze could have spread to Lord knows what secret files if we had not quickly thrown the coat on the floor and stomped on it. For years, I continued to wear the coat—minus the pocket lining—on the theory that it made a fascinating conversation piece. I have visited the CIA many times since then, and I am continually reminded that I remain one of a relative handful of journalists who do so on a regular basis.

Yet, it seems, every clown who owns or can borrow a typewriter is now making the CIA his pet whipping boy. I do not intend here or anywhere else to issue a blanket defense of the "agency," as many in Washington call it. I believe the CIA is subject to valid criticism. But I am appalled by the uninformed and demagogic attacks that descend on the agency every few years and now appear to be reaching an all-time crescendo.

Only Sunday, the New York Times revealed that the CIA allegedly compiled dossiers on 10,000 Americans who opposed U.S. participation in the Vietnam war. The Times account quoted "well-placed government sources" as saying that a special unit, reporting directly to former CIA Director Richard Helms, conducted a massive domestic intelligence operation during the 1960s and early 1970s in violation of the CIA charter. The operation was said to have included break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.

To put these events in perspective, we need to examine the origins of the CIA. During World War II, the U.S. limped along with a jerry-built intelligence operation. The fabled Office of Strategic Services, generally called the predecessor of the CIA, was not really a national intelligence-gathering agency. Numerous civilian and military agencies ran their own spy operations with little central coordination. The National Security Agency, the legal supervisor of the CIA; and the CIA were created by the National Security Act of 1947. It is from this law and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 that the CIA draws its mandate.

The CIA was empowered to "advise the National Security Council in matters involving such intelligence activities . . . to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities . . . and to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct" (emphasis added).

The italicized provision has been the most troublesome for the CIA. But it must be considered in the light of certain prohibitions placed by Congress in the 1947 law. The CIA is barred from exercising "police, subpoena,

law-enforcement or internal-security functions." In other words, the CIA, unlike the FBI, cannot compel an American citizen or even an alien to do anything. A CIA agent cannot make an arrest, cannot legally conduct wiretapping or other surveillance activities within the U.S. or even investigate radical groups within the country.

That is the law. Whether it is obeyed to the letter is questionable. The Watergate affair clearly demonstrated violations of the spirit and letter of the 1947 law. And while the CIA may have had legitimate functions in Chile before the fall of President Allende, that role surely did not include protecting ITT investments at the expense of corrupting the Chilean political process.

On Dec. 13, (before the story in the Times), I conducted a lengthy interview with William Colby, the current CIA director. We discussed in detail the overlap between legitimate CIA operations abroad and domestic threats to the national security. Many such threats originate in foreign countries, Colby said, but pose difficult intelligence and law enforcement problems within the U.S. He contended that close cooperation among CIA, other intelligence agencies and the FBI prevented abuses of the CIA charter while preserving national security. He conceded that there had been some abuses in past years, but contended that they had been magnified by critics of the CIA.

In my opinion, the CIA often is blamed for the sins of other government agencies. Thus, members of the anti-war movement who found themselves harassed by government agents often railed against the CIA when the appropriate target of their criticism should have been the State and Justice Departments, the White House, the FBI, the Secret Service or the Internal Revenue Service. In only rare cases, as far as I have been able to discern, were CIA employees involved in such harassment.

It is nonetheless clear that any CIA surveillance operation within this country is contrary to the agency's charter. If the revelations in the Times are indeed true, the CIA was acting illegally and should not have done so. But, for example, a CIA agent keeping tabs on a Communist official abroad might properly file a report on a meeting between the official and a prominent anti-war activist like Jane Fonda. That report would not necessarily constitute a violation of Miss Fonda's constitutional rights.

The accountability of the CIA hinges on the role of the National Security Council. Although the National Security Council is treated by law as a distinct government entity, it actually functions as a branch of the White House. It is composed of the President, the vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense and the director of the Office of Emergency Planning. In addition, the President may appoint other members from the cabinet and sub-cabinet. There is also a professional staff headed by the President's special assistant for national security.

Thus it is obvious that the CIA is directly accountable to the President and his aides. While CIA must report to Congress on some of its expenditures and policies, the executive branch clearly controls the agency. I view as sheer balderdash the commonly held theory that the CIA is a law unto itself—carrying on all man-

mer of secret missions and even small wars without the knowledge or consent of the White House. Anyone who truly believes that knows little about how the federal bureaucracy works. I cannot imagine any President, secretary of state, secretary of defense or special assistant for national security affairs being so trusting of a government agency as to allow that to happen.

I have dealt closely with CIA officers—not only headquarters officials but field operatives—for two decades. I have tramped many a muddy boondock with agents who asked little except that the tweed-jacketed executives back at headquarters try to understand the problems of field work. In the main, I have found CIA officers at all levels to be intelligent, dedicated public servants. They are no different, in most respects, from other civil servants. They have homes, wives, husbands, children, mortgages, gardens and hobbies.

Nonetheless, we need a new look at the CIA. The President's virtual unilateral control over CIA and other intelligence agencies should be limited. Obviously, any tinkering should not prevent the government from moving with dispatch in an emergency. But there's no reason, for example, why Congress could not be represented in some manner on the National Security Council. Nor is there any reason why the appropriate congressional

committees should not exercise more public supervision over intelligence matters.

The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, for example, conducts many public hearings that do not result in disclosure of vital government secrets. While some congressional hearings on CIA are public, far too many others are conducted behind closed doors. As a result, many members of Congress who do not serve on the CIA oversight committees are denied information to which they are entitled. The American public, as well, is kept in the dark about too much CIA business.

It is just such secrecy that contributes to the mystique surrounding CIA—to the agency's detriment. We must become more realistic about our intelligence agencies. They should not become bogeymen. But they have. And the time is at hand to remedy that situation by making necessary reforms and, equally important, by adjusting our perceptions.

Michael Dorman, a Dix Hills resident, is the author of "The Infernal Money-Making Machine," a book about Robert Vesco scheduled for publication early next year. He is now at work on a political biography of George Wallace.

WASHINGTON STAR
01 January 1975

Smith Hempstone:

Andropov's Last Laugh

In his well-appointed Moscow office on the third floor of the gray stone building at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov will be having himself a good laugh as he reads the news dispatches about the problems of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Andropov, a tall, scholarly 60-year-old, is chairman of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the Committee for State Security, the Russian counterpart of the CIA and KGB.

Andropov, who distinguished himself as Soviet ambassador to Budapest by presiding over the liquidation of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, is a far more powerful man than was either the late J. Edgar Hoover or any of the six men who have directed the CIA since its creation in 1947.

THE RUSSIAN superspy, who took over the direction of the KGB in 1967 (a year after Richard Helms, now American ambassador to Teheran, became CIA director), in 1973 became the first head of the se-

cret police since Lavrenti Beria to be elected to the all-powerful 17-member Politburo that runs the Soviet Union.

As KGB chief, Andropov directs the activities of an estimated 90,000 staff officers (a figure that dwarfs the personnel strength of the entire Western intelligence community). One of the primary tasks of Special Service II of the KGB's First Directorate is the penetration of Western intelligence agencies.

ANDROPOV'S predecessors succeeded brilliantly in the case of Kim Philby, who until his defection to the Soviet Union in 1963 had been a Soviet agent for 30 years, and for some years the British intelligence service's top liaison man with the CIA.

Insofar as is publicly known, there has never been anything comparable in the CIA to the Philby affair, no top-level penetration of the agency by a KGB agent.

And the man who since 1954 has been charged with the responsibility of preventing the Russians from insinuating

agents into the CIA is 57-year-old James Angleton. Angleton's resignation from the CIA—and those of three of his top aides—became effective yesterday, in the wake of charges that the counterintelligence chief directed the illegal surveillance of more than 10,000 Americans under the Nixon administration.

Angleton, an accomplished botanist, the friend of poets, and a Yale graduate, has been portrayed by certain former CIA officers as an unrelenting Cold Warrior who saw Communists under every bed. But that, after all, was his job. And it is not one that is likely to make its holder very popular with his colleagues.

ANGLETON, who is said to have kept a hand-written list of the holders of the 50 CIA posts the KGB would most like to penetrate (and to have kept their holders under surveillance), is reported to have asked the FBI in the late 1960s to conduct an investigation of a handful of CIA officials of whom he was suspicious, including two men still with the agency. The FBI probe, ac-

cording to an informant of the New York Times' Seymour Hersh, was little more than a perfunctory whitewash.

In his 1971 novel, "The Rope-Dancer," Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official, described "Frank Wellington," the fictional head of the agency's counterintelligence branch, as an anti-Communist fanatic who had never completely recovered from a nervous breakdown. Is "Frank Wellington" James Angleton and, if so, is Marchetti's portrayal of him anywhere near accurate?

BOTH HELMS and Angleton deny that they were involved in any illegal domestic spying. If they were not, who was? Or was anyone?

At this point in time, as someone once put it, nothing is certain. Except that Yuri Andropov and all the gang at 2 Dzerzhinsky Square must be beside themselves with glee: When this thing has run its course, there may not be enough left of the CIA to make it worth the KGB's time to penetrate it.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

Close Survey of C.I.A. Opposed by Goldwater

PHOENIX, Ariz., Dec. (AP)—Congress will be making "a big mistake" if it undertakes too strong an investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency for alleged domestic spying, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, said

today.

Mr. Goldwater, holding his annual news conference from his home, said that he had no knowledge of domestic spying but that the C.I.A. should be allowed to keep "domestic subversives" under surveillance.

"I don't think anybody could say we don't have some people who wouldn't want to overthrow the Government."

he said. "It would want to know more about the background of people like Daniel Ellsberg and what's behind them."

He also said that he could not support Vice President Rockefeller for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976, but "would be active in support" of Gov. Ronald Reagan of California.

NEWSDAY
24 DEC 1974

Congressional Surveillance for the CIA

If the Central Intelligence Agency really has accumulated files on more than 10,000 American citizens, there are two obvious questions to be answered: (1) How was the CIA able to violate with such impunity the federal charter that specifically prohibits it from domestic spying? (2) Why did the agency choose to break the law rather than turn the cases over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has the statutory responsibility for domestic counter-intelligence?

There's only one way to get the answers to these questions: The congressional committees that are supposed to oversee the CIA's operations must demand them from Richard Helms, who was director of the agency during the time when the illegal spying was allegedly undertaken on a grand scale, and from other present and former CIA and FBI officials who can throw some light on the tensions between those two bureaucracies. And as Michael Dorman suggests on today's op-ed page, the congressional hearings should be as public as possible.

It's not enough for President Ford to ask Henry Kissinger to investigate and report back to him in a few days. In the first place, that kind of haste would only guarantee a skin-deep probe rather than the "penetrating investigation" former CIA Director John McCone has called for. In the second, Kissinger himself has been so closely involved with CIA operations—for instance, the undermining of the Allende government in Chile—and with intelligence-gathering techniques of questionable legality—for instance, the wiretaps on several of his subordinates—that no investigation of his would be convincing.

Admittedly the Senate and House Armed Services subcommittees responsible for looking over the CIA's shoulder have seldom exhibited any desire to know more than the agency desires to tell them. In fact, the subcommittee chairman—Senator John Stennis and Representative Lucien Nedzi—were apparently briefed on the

domestic-spying operation last year by CIA Director William Colby, and there's no evidence that they revealed it even to other subcommittee members, much less to the public. But now the chairmen have no choice in the matter; unless they show some determination to clip the agency's wings when it gets out of hand, the 94th Congress is apt to turn the job over to somebody else.

No doubt a Democratic Congress can extract some partisan advantage from bringing the CIA under more effective control, especially in view of the agency's role in the Watergate horrors. But the matter goes far beyond partisanship. Helms himself was named CIA director by President Johnson, and there have been hints that the agency conducted illegal domestic operations almost routinely in the Eisenhower years under its original director, the late Allen Dulles.

The congressional investigators should range freely over the links between the CIA and the FBI. Domestic spying by the CIA becomes more comprehensible if J. Edgar Hoover's animosity made it impossible for the FBI to follow up the leads it got from the agency—but of course the remedy for that is better supervision of the bureau, not broader power for the CIA.

When the agency was established in 1947, Congress deliberately excluded it from internal-security matters because it didn't want to create a Gestapo or KGB-type apparatus. A congressional investigation is needed now to find out just how far off its reservation the CIA has strayed. But the real question is not how and why the agency came to do things it ought to have left to the FBI; it's whether those things can justifiably be done at all in an open society. It does us no good to prevent break-ins, wiretaps, mail-tampering and surveillance by the CIA if some other arm of government can subject us to the same police-state techniques simply because we oppose the policies of the government in power. In short, those who investigate the CIA should have one eye on its charter and the other on the Bill of Rights.

WASHINGTON POST
28 December 1974

Citizens' CIA Unit Is Urged

Kissinger Asks President to Order Probe

By William Grider
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others have urged President Ford to appoint a citizens commission to investigate the accusations of illegal domestic spying facing the Central Intelligence Agency, administration sources said yesterday.

The sources said Kissinger discussed the idea with the President and White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld by telephone earlier this week, before a 50-page report by CIA Director William E. Colby was sent to the President, who is vacationing in Vail, Colo.

In Colorado yesterday, a presidential press aide declined to comment on the report that Mr. Ford is considering such a step as an answer to public controversy over the CIA's domestic activities.

According to one source, the idea was pushed by Kissinger and others within the administration and outside the government in the hope that such a forum would stem public controversy and provide a review of the allegations of CIA spying in a "rational, unemotional and careful manner."

If the President makes such a move, it is not expected to deter the various congressional committees which already have announced plans to investigate the charges, the source said. Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee which oversees the intelligence agency, said yesterday he intends to proceed with his own hearings, in open session.

"We have our own responsibilities to pursue," Nedzi said, "and I don't see how that would be affected by an independent commission."

Meanwhile, a leading congressional critic of the CIA, Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), filed a lawsuit against the government yesterday in U.S. District Court here, charging that the CIA's domestic spying and its

action" against foreign governments are both illegal activities under the agency's original charter.

"How many times can the CIA violate the law before corrective action is taken?" Harrington asked.

According to an administration source, publication of the Colby report to President Ford "will cause some hell" with foreign governments, though he would not elaborate on why. The White House has said Mr. Ford is considering whether to make any or all of the CIA report public.

"There is no reason for Jerry Ford to cover anything up," the source said, implying that any controversial episodes described in Colby's report pre-date Mr. Ford's tenure in office. Nedzi, who had been briefed previously on CIA domestic activities of questionable legality, also emphasized that the episodes in question date from a prior time and said he has been assured that they have been discontinued.

"In all probability, the National Security Council has been aware" of the CIA's domestic surveillance activities, Nedzi said yesterday.

The council, which reports directly to the President, has been headed by Kissinger since 1969.

In a telephone interview, Nedzi told the Associated Press he based his statement on the fact that the security council "generally oversees those activities [of the CIA] that are not routine."

Nedzi said he presumes he was given the same information that is contained in the report sent to President Ford.

Administration sources would not discuss which private citizens might be appointed to the inquiry, but acknowledged that the commission approach would not entirely stem public skepticism about CIA activities.

"I think if it got the right people on it to establish the facts," one well placed source said, "it is less likely to be driven by the spirit of the moment than congressional investigations would be."

Rep. Harrington's lawsuit names CIA Director Colby, Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William E. Simon as defendants, and seeks an injunction prohibiting any further "covert action" against foreign governments. Kissinger is held responsible as national security affairs adviser to the President and chairman of the 40 Committee, which clears CIA actions. Simon is named as dispenser of federal funds

NEW YORK TIMES
28 December 1974

A Suit to Curb C.I.A. Activities Announced by Rep. Harrington

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 27—Representative Michael J. Harrington filed a suit today in Federal District Court here to force the Central Intelligence Agency to halt covert intervention in foreign countries and domestic surveillance activities.

The Massachusetts Democrat told reporters that he had brought the court action "to force the C.I.A. to obey its charter"—that is, the National Security Act of 1947.

He added that under his interpretation of the law, the agency had overstepped the rules — by covert operations abroad and by "involvement in the Watergate affair and the activities of the White House plumbers."

Mr. Harrington submitted reports published by The New York Times during the last week concerning alleged C.I.A. domestic espionage operations as further indication of "illegal activities" by the agency.

Meanwhile, in Vail, Colo., Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary, said that President Ford was reading a 50-page report on allegations that the C.I.A. participated in illegal domestic spying during the Nixon Administration.

Mr. Harrington said that he had asked the New York law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard to prepare his suit as a result of "revelations" last September that the C.I.A. had engaged in actions against the Chilean Government of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens. The Allende Government was overthrown by a military junta in 1973.

to the agency.

Harrington cited as illegal a long list of known activities by the CIA, ranging from its secret intervention against the government of Chile to its involvement in the Watergate affair and its cooperation with the White House "plumbers" who committed a burglary during the Nixon administration.

The lawsuit argues that the 1947 National Security Act limits the CIA to foreign activities "relating to intelligence" but does not permit paramilitary assaults like the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 or financing a coup against the premier of Iran in 1953 or a variety of other direct actions which the CIA has taken against foreign governments over the last 25 years.

Harrington said Congress had made "a dismal record" of supervising these secret activities, though he is also advocating congressional action to

Named as defendants in the suit are William E. Colby, the Central Intelligence Director, Secretary of State Kissinger in his capacity as national security adviser to the President, and Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, for allegedly providing unvouchered funds to the agency.

Mr. Harrington said that the suit would cost him "nothing directly." Michael Krinsky, an assistant to the law firm, said

that the fees for the suit would be absorbed by the firm and would amount to no more than "several hundred dollars."

Mr. Harrington, who has been a sharp critic of C.I.A. activities over the last year, said "The failure of Congress" to provide adequate legislative oversight was "an incentive."

"It's my belief that the C.I.A. has systematically violated its charter in the foreign field," he said. His suit lists 65 points of alleged C.I.A. "violations," including its involvement in the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba, the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan Government and support of a rebellion in Indonesia in 1958.

Mr. Harrington, who is a lawyer, said that he hoped the court action would at the very least bring about a binding interpretation of the 1947 statute regulating the C.I.A.

for oversight of the CIA.

Agency officials have argued in the past that their legal authorization for covert operations is contained in a blanket directive in 1947 which says the CIA should "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Harrington told a press conference yesterday that this language is ambiguous at best and, in his judgment, does not permit secret investigations because it includes the words, "refuting to intelligence."

[Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.), in his annual news conference at his hilltop home in Phoenix, said Congress will be making a "big mistake" if it undertakes too strong an investigation of the CIA. He said the agency should be allowed to keep "domestic subversives" under surveillance.]

WASHINGTON STAR
27 DEC 1974

Smith Hempstone: The CIA's Rope-Dancers

The Watergate break-in of June 1972 and the subsequent investigations arising from it point to a degree of CIA involvement in domestic affairs shocking to many Americans. Items:

• All but one of those involved in the break-in had been CIA operatives, career or contract, at one time or another.

• Top CIA officials, at the request of the White House, provided the "plumbers" group with technical assistance.

• CIA Director Richard Helms, who was close to retirement and might have been expected to stay on at the agency he had directed since 1966, was suddenly replaced and appointed ambassador to Iran in February 1973.

• On June 23 of the same year, transcripts of the White House tapes reveal President Nixon remarking to H. R. Haldeman: "Well, we've protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things."

• One of the first acts of Helms' successor, James R. Schlesinger (now secretary of defense) was to initiate a 10 percent cutback in CIA personnel.

Now Seymour Hersh, who revealed the My Lai massacre, asserts (quoting unnamed "sources") that the

CIA has directly violated its charter by conducting "a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" against anti-war protesters and other dissident groups during the Nixon administration. Hersh, writing in the Dec. 22 editions of the New York Times, seems to finger James Angleton, head of the CIA's Counterintelligence Department, as the mastermind of an operation that produced files on "at least 10,000 American citizens." Angleton announced his resignation Tuesday "in the interest of the agency."

IN A 1971 "novel" called "The Rope-Dancer," Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official (another of whose books is quoted from in Hersh's article), portrays the fictional character who holds Angleton's job as a half-mad paranoid.

The CIA's present director, William Colby, who took over from Schlesinger in September of last year, has told President Ford that "nothing comparable" to the allegations in Hersh's article had taken place.

Because the Central Intelligence Agency is vital to the national security of the United States, one naturally would prefer to believe Colby. Nor

can one discount the view of a retired CIA official, Ray S. Cline, that Helms would have had more sense than to have allowed himself to become involved in any illegal activity. (Cline, who left the agency in 1969 to become head of the State Department's Department of Intelligence and Research, has no particular reason to love Helms, who in 1966 edged him out for the directorship of the CIA.)

BUT THE allegations published by Hersh in the Times, unsubstantiated as they were, were so serious that there was no way of avoiding an investigation of the CIA by the National Security Council headed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. One thing is essential: that the investigation should be searching enough to reveal the truth but sufficiently discreet not to compromise the crucial work abroad in which the CIA is legitimately involved.

Because there are gray areas in which the jurisdiction of the CIA and that of the FBI appear to overlap (for instance, the CIA apparently may legally tail a suspected foreign intelligence agent in the United States but must call on the FBI to arrest him), one

deduces that there may indeed have been violations of the CIA's charter. Whether these violations have been as "massive" as Hersh's sources allege—or whether they betray a studied policy of illegality—is another matter.

ONE SUSPECTS that when Schlesinger (who unlike Helms and Colby was not a career CIA man) took over the agency, he discovered that certain CIA officers had overstepped the bounds of legality. And one deduces that most of those guilty of such improprieties were among that 10 percent discharged or prematurely retired by Schlesinger for "budgetary or technological reasons."

In other words, this observer is of the view that there was some fire beneath Hersh's smoke, but that Schlesinger and Colby almost certainly have extinguished it and disciplined those who knowingly, unwittingly or under White House pressure violated their trust.

All of us will be the losers if an investigation of the illegal acts of a few individuals is allowed to destroy the effectiveness of an institution that has served this country well and is fundamental to its national security.

After that, we'll have to face a still tougher question: Whether any rules will be permanently binding on an agency whose specialty, after all, is to operate beyond them.

The New York Times started the uproar Sunday by printing allegations that the CIA, in flat violation of its own charter, had conducted massive surveillance against members of antiwar and other dissident groups during the Nixon administration. It said that a special counterintelligence unit, reporting directly to Mr. Helms, had compiled files on at least 10,000 American citizens. It appears that the spying did not begin with Mr. Nixon: Documents in the CIA's files indicate that hundreds of other illegal operations were carried out in the United States beginning in the 1950s.

There has been a commendable hurry to investigate these findings. President Ford requested and got a detailed report from CIA Director William E. Colby. The chairmen of four congressional panels, including the armed services committees of both chambers, announced plans for full inquiries when the new Congress convenes.

A flurry of activity, however, is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to launch more investigations by panels that failed to turn up anything in the past. The task now is not only to find out how that happened, but how to make absolutely certain it can never happen again.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
27 DEC 1974

The CIA's private war

Charges that the Central Intelligence Agency carried out illegal spying operations against American citizens may be a shock. They cannot exactly be called a surprise. This has always been the recognized, built-in risk of having government agencies like the CIA, where power is necessarily combined with secrecy. The combination does not easily conform with laws or rules, not even its own.

There is no choice now but to establish the facts, in full and without cosmetics, about the CIA's past domestic operations. We believe the best way to do that is to set up a special congressional committee to investigate them—one that will include, but will not be limited to, members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees who have regularly dealt with the CIA in the past. Those committees have pretty well demonstrated their inability to act as efficient watchdogs over its operations.

No doubt there will be strong objections to such an inquiry. We will be told that our counterintelligence system will be compromised and the United States left virtually defenseless if the Ameri-

can public finds out too much about what the CIA has been doing. Two things, we think, need to be said.

First, we've heard it before: It seemed to a guiding principle of the Nixon administration—almost its only one—that the public is better off not knowing what its leaders are doing; that patriotism means not asking too many questions. The last two years have been a massive disproof of that doctrine, and it cannot be made to sound convincing now. If Watergate proved anything, it proved that the more we know about our government the safer we—and it—are.

Second, the charges concern CIA operations during the Nixon administration and before. Investigating them does not mean that every detail of the agency's present workings must be exposed. [They have been greatly changed under the two men who succeeded Richard Helms as director of Central Intelligence.] The point is not to cripple the CIA but to keep it from crippling us; and to do that, the American public will have to know exactly what happened to this agency—why the seemingly iron-clad rules against spying on U. S. citizens turned so soft and porous that they could be set aside almost at will.

WASHINGTON STAR
27 December 1974

The Price Of Probing The CIA

By Frank Getlein

It is possible, to be sure, that the New York Times made up out of whole cloth the story about the Central Intelligence Agency's undertaking to spy upon and collect dossiers on some 10,000 Americans suspected of having opinions on the American War Against the Indochinese different from those of the White House.

The Times would have done this, in the view of moderate right-wing kooks, for the same reason the Times printed every word it did print about the crimes of the Nixon administration — namely, to sell papers.

Alternatively, the Times might have done this for the same reason it printed the Pentagon Papers, in the view of all-out right-wing kooks — namely that the Times, like most of the American press and broadcast-news organizations, is in the pay of the Kremlin and out to destroy the United States.

On the other hand, it is just faintly conceivable that what the Times printed about the CIA's assault upon the Republic is true and that former CIA director Richard Helms is a dangerous criminal who should be hauled home, perhaps in irons, to stand trial.

IMMEDIATE DENIALS were apparently issued by all sources. But examination reveals the immediate denials to have been a lot more immediate than denials; to have been, in fact, not denials at all.

Current CIA director William Colby, for example, assured President Ford, who in turn assured the nation, that nothing at all like the things described in the Times article is going on at the agency now.

That's fine, but that's not the issue. The question is not what is happening now, but what happened then.

Similarly, Helms himself, after fleeing from his post as ambassador to Iran to a European hideaway, issued a statement asserting that nothing illegal was done. Again, fine, but the important point is that he did not deny the spying, only the illegality of any possible spying that may have taken place.

LIKewise, James Angleton, director of counter-intelligence activities, resigned from his post not in protest against the lies of the Times, but to spare the agency further trouble, a reason strangely recollective of Nixon's resigning because he had lost his political base in Congress rather than because he faced impeachment, trial, conviction, ousting from office and possibly jail.

In short, there hasn't been any denial at all that the events the Times asserts took place did take place. The Helms denial of their illegality is something else again and presents to the nation a question that can only be decided by the nation, not by spooks in cellar corridors out at Langley, not even by history professors on holiday dabbling in the intoxications of power.

The question is, do we want a society in which the thoughts, conversations, mail communications and travels of the citizens are subject to the surveillance of a secret police and spy organization?

Or, on the other hand, do we want to abolish the CIA?

It may come down to that before the investigation of the matter is over — assuming, that is, that an honest investigation is conducted, and not one by the agency itself, by its presumed master, Henry Kissinger, or by the compliant congressional committees it has hoodwinked so routinely for years.

IF INVESTIGATION reveals that none of the alleged acts took place, that's fine, and the government and individuals affected can take appropriate legal action against the Times.

If the investigation reveals that all those acts did take place, and proceeds to legal actions against Helms et al, beginning with citations of contempt of Congress, that's fine, too.

LONDON TIMES
23 December 1974

Congress investigation of CIA seems inevitable

From Our Own Correspondent
Washington, Dec 22

Spokesmen for the Central Intelligence Agency said today that the massive exposure by *The New York Times* this morning of "illegal" CIA counter-intelligence activities inside the United States during the Nixon years might bring an official response tomorrow. They would give no further comment, but all the signs are that a thorough investigation of the CIA is now inevitable in the new Congress.

The newspaper, in a long article by Mr Seymour Hersh, accused the CIA of violating the 1947 law which established the agency and directed it to keep its dirty tricks abroad. Explicitly, the CIA has no police or internal security functions. Counter-intelligence inside the United States is officially the province of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The article reports that Dr James Schlesinger, when briefly head of the CIA last year before moving on to the Pentagon, put an end to its illegal activities and dismissed some of the staff. It added that the Justice Department might now be asked to determine whether there should be prosecutions.

Mr Hersh reports that the special operations branch of the agency's counter-intelligence department conducted surveillance of some 10,000 opponents of the Vietnam war during the Nixon years. There were said to be computerized files on them.

He quotes unnamed sources, stating that the CIA even recruited informants and penetrated dissident organizations. In addition the CIA, starting back in the 1950s, conducted

But if the investigation discovers that such acts did indeed take place but that they were "justified" by the agency's own interpretation of its mission — in short, that the agency had to destroy the Republic in order to save the Republic — then the nation will have no choice but to decide the question stated above.

For years now, the standard defense of all the dubious activities of the agency abroad has been that in this wicked world we have to be as wicked as everyone else and we are lucky to have the self-sacrificing agency spooks available to do our wickedness for us.

In short, we can't afford not to have the CIA.

The question now may become: Can we afford to have it?

break-ins, buggings and mail interception operations, principally against foreign intelligence connexions here. This is the private fief of the FBI and its officials, unnamed, were stated to be indignant at this usurpation.

Mr Hersh raises difficult questions about the role of Mr Richard Helms, the CIA director for most of the period, who is now Ambassador to Iran. He reports the suggestion that the White House tapes convey an awareness by President Nixon of what was going on.

Mr Hersh names Mr James Angleton, head of the highly secret CIA counter-intelligence department, as the man responsible for the direction of the surveillance, and Mr Richard Ober, now at the White House, as the liaison man with Mr. Helms.

There is surprise here that Mr Hersh managed to get Mr Angleton to talk on the telephone, and somewhat indiscreetly at that. He is quoted as denying that the CIA had ever operated purely domestically, and he apparently suggested, as did many other CIA sources quoted in the article, that anti-war activity here was directed by foreign subversion.

For instance, Mr Angleton is said to have claimed that the CIA obtained through an American agent in Moscow intelligence on the bombings perpetrated here during the high tide of anti-war activity.

Mr Angleton, it is stated, then added: "It came from Moscow. Our source there is still active, and still productive — the opposition still doesn't know."

LONDON TIMES
27 December 1974

Analysis

Ford data will decide new CIA controversy

By HENRY L TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Even with most of the relevant details still secret, the course of the latest controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency is beginning to emerge.

Something of a consensus of intelligence specialists and powerful members of Congress suggests three basic conclusions. That there will be hearings in Congress is certain. The question is whether they will be coordinated or scattered among several committees.

There is a fair possibility, by no means a certainty, of legislation attempting to define more clearly what the agency can do within the United States. All efforts to control by legislation the agency's activities abroad will fail.

What happens within those general outlines will be determined in great measure by the seriousness of the details contained in a 50-page report now in the hands of President Ford. From his vacation home at Vail, Colo., Mr. Ford has said he may release all or portions of the report.

Most recent debate

The most recent debate over the agency began last weekend. It opened with publication of charges that the agency had conducted a massive campaign of illegal domestic activity, including burglary, during the administration of former President Nixon. The initial reports also said the agency maintains files of 10,000 names, including anti-war dissidents in the United States. The two points, usually treated together in the controversy, are not directly related.

Specialists in intelligence say there is no question that the agency maintains extensive computerized files of foreign nationals and Americans who have had even peripheral contact with them. "These are reference and information files, not action files," one remarked.

"I don't think most Americans, on reflection, would want it any other way." The names come from many sources, the specialist said, including agents and embassies abroad. At home the sources may be

as diverse as the FBI and commercial publications.

The question of direct CIA activity within the United States is another matter. Under the National Security Act, which created the CIA in 1947, the agency is denied police and law enforcement functions, subpoena power, and any role in internal security. The current controversy turns on that last proscription.

"Many people think the CIA is forbidden to operate domestically, period," says a former intelligence officer. "That's just not so. If it happens that an American agent is following a known or suspected foreign agent, he doesn't stop following at the water's edge. He may continue surveillance in co-operation with the FBI, but it is the FBI with the police power."

"Of course, the CIA people cannot erase from their minds the Americans who enter into the picture along the way."

But other experts assume that the report to Mr. Ford will reveal more serious facts. They believe Richard M. Helms, former director of central intelligence, may have tolerated direct violations of the agency's mandate much as he briefly permitted CIA co-operation in the illegal activities of the so-called White House "plumbers" in 1971.

To the extent that the record shows such activities as wire-tapping and burglary carried out against dissident Americans by the CIA, the sentiment for control on Capitol Hill will be fueled. One specialist believes the record will show some cases during the early Nixon administration and possibly late in the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson.

"But I think there were few cases, certainly not on the order charged," he said. By all accounts, the successors to Mr. Helms, James R. Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense, and William E. Colby, the present director, made certain there were no continuing direct violations.

Sources on Capitol Hill believe this outline, if it proves out in detail, may leave the congressional power structure amenable to legislation delineating in detail the CIA's rights at home. Critics of the agency hope also to prevent its direct

Mr Ford studies CIA reply to allegations of domestic 'spying'

From Patrick Brogan . . .
Washington, Dec 26

President Ford, who is on holiday in Colorado, spent this morning skiing and the afternoon studying a 50-page report on the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was prepared by Mr. William Colby, the director of the CIA, under the order of Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, and concerns allegations that the agency investigated the activities of 10,000 Americans during the Nixon Administration.

If the allegations are true, this would be a gross violation of the law. The CIA was set up in 1947 and its charter provides that it may deal only with foreign intelligence. Counter-espionage is the duty of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The allegation appeared in *The New York Times* on Sunday, an embarrassing Christmas present to the Government from Mr Seymour Hersh, the reporter who first revealed the My Lai massacre. There have been flat denials from various quarters in the past five days and partial confirmations from others.

Mr. James Angleton, the agency's director of counter-intelligence, who has been with it for 31 years, resigned yesterday, under instructions. Mr. Richard Helms, who was head of the agency from 1966 to 1973 and is now Ambassador to Iran, is returning to Washington to face the storm.

The State Department put out a denial from Mr. Helms that he had ever authorized the gathering of domestic intelligence. No less than five committees or sub-committees of

Congress intend to investigate the matter as soon as the new Congress assembles next month.

Mr. Lucien Nedzi, of Michigan, who is chairman of the House of Representatives sub-committee which is meant to supervise the CIA, has admitted that he was informed of some of the details of the agency's domestic activities last summer. He has managed so far to avoid saying just what he was told, while implying that *The New York Times* has found out details which he never knew about.

Mr. Helms's two successors, Dr. James Schlesinger, who is now Secretary of Defence, and Mr. Colby have both let it be known that the CIA never engaged in anything illegal during their time in office but that strange things may have taken place earlier.

The connexion with Watergate is obvious. Mr. Nixon's first reaction to the original Watergate investigation was to use the CIA to stop the FBI from getting into "productive areas".

If it is now proved that the CIA had been in the habit of meddling in domestic affairs, then Mr. Nixon's efforts in June, 1972, would seem easily explicable.

The CIA has managed to escape from the toils of Watergate so far, but it may be about to succumb. Mr. John Dean has hinted that there are other and so far unknown scandals of the Nixon Administration. It may now emerge that Mr. Nixon's first attempt to set up a secret police to spy on his political opponents, before he established the "plumbers" in the White House, was to use the CIA.

NEW YORK TIMES

2 JANUARY 1975

C.I.A.: The Best News

To the Editor:

If, as you claim, the C.I.A. was spying on anti-war activists in the U.S., it has got to be the best news I have had all year. At least someone was out there trying to protect this country. Illegal, you say. Perhaps, but so is rioting, draft card burning, and draft dodging. At least the C.I.A. was on our side.

SYLVAN SHERMAN
New Providence, N.J., Dec. 27, 1974

involvement in the internal political affairs of other countries—such as the undermining of the former government of Chile. That attempt, however, will encounter the total opposition of the administration.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
28 DEC 1974

How war against CIA grew

By WILLIAM A. RUSHER

The hullabaloo over alleged "illegal" intelligence operations by the CIA within the United States offers connoisseurs of political propaganda an almost matchless opportunity to watch our liberal media "manage" the news. To understand what is really going on, you must first learn the name of the game, and then the identity of some of the principal players.

Since at least the mid-1960s, leftist and liberal forces in the United States have, for a variety of sick reasons, been conducting a savage public attack on the nation's defensive institutions.

One assault has been aimed at the Armed Forces (through TV smear-documentaries like "The Selling of the Pentagon," exaggerations of command responsibility for the My Lai massacre, etc.).

Another has been directed at the domestic police establishment (through attacks on the FBI and the National Guard), by caricaturing local cops as "pigs," and by condemning prison facilities.

A third front has recently been opened against the CIA, which is America's secret intelligence agency in the ongoing struggle against Communist aggression. At first it seemed that it might be possible to tie the CIA to Watergate, and destroy it along with Richard Nixon; but it soon became clear that the agency had kept its skirts depressingly clean of involvement.

A second opportunity to wing the CIA came along, however, when the Chilean armed forces overthrew the Marxist regime of Salvador Allende last year. Worldwide Communist propaganda promptly accused the CIA of being behind the coup.

Now we must get specific and name a few names. The chief journalistic point-man for the CIA hit is a New York Times reporter named Seymour Hersh.

we are not permitted to know exactly how it happened, but certain secret testimony by CIA officials before a congressional committee, concerning CIA activities in Chile, found its way into the hands of ultra-liberal Democratic Congressman Michael Harrington of Massachusetts and thence to Hersh.

Now, it appears, newshound Hersh has found another truffle. Some faceless liberal in the vast Washington bureaucracy has slipped him evidence that, during the later years of the Vietnam War, the CIA

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
28 DEC 1974

CIA Reportedly Began Domestic Spying in 1947

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.), chairman of the special House Subcommittee on Intelligence, said Friday that questionable CIA activities within the United States have been going on almost since the agency's founding in 1947.

Asked when he thought the CIA first started domestic surveillance, Nedzi replied simply: "How long has the agency been in existence?"

Nedzi said that he expects further disclosures of possible illegal activity by the agency, but added that the loopholes in the National Security Act make it unclear as to whether the CIA had actually violated the law.

Nedzi also asserted that the National Security Council — which, reports directly to the President — "has been aware of some, perhaps all," of the questionable domestic spying.

But the agency, he added, claims that much of its domestic spying has been necessary to protect its agents and sources of information here and abroad.

Although Nedzi refused to discuss specific incidents, one source familiar with in-

telligence activities here said that the CIA often wiretapped and spied on its own agents here to protect them or to be sure that they were loyal.

As far as he knows, Nedzi said, the domestic activities of the CIA have not been as extensive as was alleged in a New York Times story during the weekend, but acknowledged that CIA officials whom he had questioned might not have told him all of the truth.

"There is some indication that even the CIA directors may not have known what was going on in the compartments below them," Nedzi said.

Nevertheless, Nedzi predicted that "as this unfolds, there will be more and more reports of incidents that are questionable. It is my judgment that some of the things done have gone beyond the bounds of impropriety."

Early next year, Nedzi's subcommittee plans to begin an investigation into the domestic activities of the CIA. And if Nedzi gets his way, some CIA operations, for the first time, will be made public, for he said he intends to open the hearings.

kept intelligence files on anti-war activists in the United States.

Since the CIA is legally required to confine its activities to foreign countries and leave the U. S. to the FBI, Hersh calculates that Richard Helms, the CIA director in those days who is now our ambassador to Iran, can be accused of having conducted "illegal" activities. (Never mind that that anti-war activists did not observe any equivalent limitations, but traveled back and forth to Hanoi, Paris and other foreign locales at will — or, in other words, in and out of the CIA's technical field of jurisdiction.)

Now the second-wave troops are wading ashore. You will be hearing an awful lot about "illegal" CIA activities in the U. S. on your favorite TV news show, in your favorite newsmagazine, and on the front page of your local newspaper. That's the way news is managed, you see.

"I Don't see any national security problem in this," Nedzi said. "We won't be blowing the cover from any agent or endangering lives. Therefore, the hearings should be open."

CIA director William Colby has given Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger a 59-page report for President Ford on the extent of the agency's domestic operations. Ford is studying the report in Vail, Colorado.

Nedzi has received the same information from Colby, and the indications that the National Security Council was aware is significant.

Kissinger, who has been assigned by the President to investigate allegations of impropriety or illegality, runs the Security Council. He has himself been accused of having a role in domestic wire-tapping and spying operations ordered by the Nixon White House.

According to the New York Times, the bulk of the CIA's domestic intelligence operations took place during the Nixon years and was aimed primarily at groups opposing the Vietnam War.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

A former agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, in recounting the details of his undercover career, says that New York City became a prime C.I.A. domestic spying target during the late nineteen-sixties because it was considered a "big training ground" for radical activities in the United States.

The agent, who spent more than four years in the late nineteen-sixties and early seventies spying on radical groups in New York, told The New York Times that more than 25 C.I.A. agents were assigned to the city at the height of antiwar activity at Columbia University and elsewhere.

The agents were tightly controlled by senior officials in the New York office of the Domestic Operations Division, a little-known domestic unit set up in 1964 by the C.I.A. in more than a dozen cities across the nation, the former intelligence official said.

The division's ostensible function then was legal: to coordinate with the American corporations supplying "cover" for C.I.A. agents abroad and to aid in the interrogation of American travelers after their return from foreign countries.

Began in 1967

The former agent's description of life as a domestic C.I.A. spy was provided during a series of interviews last week. The contact with The Times came after publication last Sunday of the first account of the massive spying.

The former agent said that his involvement began with the advent of the Black Panthers in 1967 and the increase of antiwar dissent during the last months of the Johnson Administration. "And then it started to snowball from there," the former agent said.

The Times, working with details supplied by the former agent, was able to verify that he served as an undercover intelligence spy, although it was impossible to check all of his information.

The former C.I.A. agent insisted on anonymity, saying that if he was exposed he would be forced to publicly deny any link to the agency.

A high-ranking Government intelligence official with intimate knowledge of C.I.A. operations said yesterday that the

former agent's description of life as a domestic spy "seemed a little bit far out." But the official added that he was unable to deny any of the agent's specific allegations, pending a check of files.

The Times, quoting well-placed sources, reported last Sunday that the C.I.A. had violated its charter by conducting massive and illegal intelligence operations aimed at antiwar and other American dissidents inside the United States. Intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens also were compiled, the sources said.

Wiretaps and Break-Ins

The former intelligence agent said that he and other C.I.A. agents had also participated in telephone wiretaps and break-ins in their efforts to closely monitor the activities of radicals in New York. He added that the C.I.A. had supplied him with "more than 40" psychological assessments of radical leaders during his spy career.

High-ranking C.I.A. officials, including Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence and now Ambassador to Iran, told Congress in the wake of the Watergate scandals that only two such assessments—done by psychiatrists working for the agency—have ever been prepared on American citizens.

"What we were trying to do," the former C.I.A. agent said in an interview, "was to find out what the radicals were marketing and to learn if they had any new products."

"They were a target company and we were like another company in competition," he added. "We were interested in their executives and that's why we did the profiles, so we could learn what we'd have to offer in order to buy them over to us."

Police Function Barred

The 1947 legislation setting up the C.I.A. bars the agency from any security or police function inside the United States, leaving all such activity to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"I knew what the charter was," the former agent said. "I'd read it, but my belief was that we were doing the same function inside the United States as the C.I.A. does outside it."

The agent said he had been recruited into the C.I.A. after graduation from college in 1965. After training in counterintelligence techniques, his first assignment was with the Domestic Operations Division office in New York.

The former agent reported that he did not have direct involvement in New York with members of the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence staff, which was headed until last week by James Angleton. The agent said that

the counterintelligence activities were normally conducted at higher bureaucratic and security levels than his.

Traditional Role

Traditionally, the counterintelligence department of the C.I.A. has sought to neutralize and expose Soviet and other foreign intelligence agents seeking to operate against the C.I.A. in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

The retirement of Mr. Angleton, a veteran of 31 years of intelligence service, became known Monday, a day after The Times article was published.

A number of well-informed C.I.A. sources subsequently confirmed that the bulk of the actual domestic spying throughout the United States was conducted by various offices of the Domestic Operations Division, which was initially assigned to such tasks in the mid-nineteen-sixties as infiltrating agents into various ethnic and emigre groups in large cities.

"When I first came to D.O.D." the former agent said, "it was a low-key operation. Mostly we did liaison" with other intelligence agencies.

Pain in the Neck

"And then someone started noticing those kids," the former agent said, referring to the antiwar activities. "At first they were just a pain in the neck. The local police and F.B.I. couldn't handle it: We had the manpower and the money."

In the beginning, he said, only files on student dissenters were kept, apparently as an addition to the already existing dossiers on the various foreign students living in the New York area.

"The first actual [physical] surveillance came when people like Mark Rudd started moving around," he said. Mr. Rudd was a leader in the student demonstrations that disrupted Columbia University for two weeks in the spring of 1968.

"We had different I.D.s for different jobs. We'd use newspaper I.D.s, or flash a badge and say we were reporter for a magazine—it made things a lot easier."

There were certain necessary precautions, he added. "If something happened in New York City, you couldn't say you were an A.P. [Associated Press] or New York Times reporter. We'd usually use Newsday. Atlantic Monthly was another good cover—no one ever heard of it."

The former agent said that the Domestic Operations Division ordered psychological profiles on Mr. Rudd "and others we felt were not just idealistic kids."

"And then we started wondering where the money was coming from," he said, referring to student protest movement. "My theory and my belief is that much of the money

was coming from the K.G.B. [the Soviet secret intelligence agency]."

One of the Domestic Operations Division's first functions was to attempt to infiltrate its agents into a radical unit targeted for domestic spying, the former C.I.A. man said. A second major goal was to "turn somebody around"—that is, convince a member of a group to become an informer.

"I could never identify myself as a C.I.A. man," the former agent said. "I always had to be a student or whatever I felt like at the time. You couldn't say you were a cop, because you might be talking to a cop."

Monitored by Superiors

The former agent repeatedly noted during the interviews that his activities were closely monitored by his superiors, some of whom maintained a "cover" office inside a large corporate headquarters.

Asked whether he ever questioned his work, the former agent replied, "Look—they [his superiors] were telling us, 'Keep an eye on them,' and to do that you're going to have to infringe on somebody's freedom."

"We got the policy from above," he added, "but we all felt the same way."

"These kids were directly involved with foreign stuff," the former agent continued. "We always worried about drugs from Communist China, K.G.B. agents and foreign guns. That's what gave us the right to come in."

In previous interviews, United States intelligence officials have characterized all of the C.I.A.'s domestic activities as being directly related to foreign espionage.

He repeatedly quoted what he said was a "catch-all phrase" around the New York domestic operations office—"intelligence is where you find it."

Helms Used Phrase

He said he and his colleagues first heard the phrase used by Mr. Helms on a training film supplied by the C.I.A. headquarters that had been shown during a staff meeting sometime in 1968.

The former C.I.A. agent recalled being assigned to take a photograph of a young woman believed to be associated with radical leaders. "They gave us a Minolta 101 camera," he said, "and told us where she lived and when to expect her. And we snapped some pictures from a parked car as she came by, shooting right through a window."

"We were interested in the kids who were training her and then were going to send her to other cities," he said. "It seemed that New York was a big training ground for cells in other cities."

Asked how the C.I.A.'s domestic espionage targets were determined, the former agent said that it "depended on the individual" under suspicion.

"If we felt that a person was working for an agency not to our liking," he said, "he became

a suspect to be placed under surveillance. As the antiwar and other dissident movements became more outspoken, he added, "any organization that advocated overthrow of the Constitution became a very hot target for us."

By the time he left the agency in early 1972, he continued, his unit's domestic files were huge. "At the end," he said, "we were working on antiwar professors and attorneys. We'd figured out a way to log and map up the whole world."

"The goal of our operation," he said, "was to find out beforehand what they [radicals] were going to go—it was preventative. We just wanted to find out what they were up to and pass it on."

Professors Were Great

In that regard, the former C.I.A. man said, "the professors were great. They wanted to work with you."

"A professor," he added, "no matter how liberal he was—he was mad. He didn't want those kids to tell them how to run his university."

After the disturbances at Columbia, the former agent said, he was given an opportunity to infiltrate a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society.

"I had no qualms when I was asked," he recalled. "In a way I thought it was almost a promotion. I figured that if I did real good, maybe I could get out of the country"—that is, an overseas agency assignment.

"I went undercover for four and a half months," he said.

After the bombings and other violent disturbances allegedly committed by the Weathermen, the former agent said, being an undercover agent "got scary."

"Before it was like a game," he added, "but later, if you were blown [identified], you didn't know what the kids would do to you."

He and other undercover men in his unit worked closely together, he said, and even were sent on special out-of-town trips together.

"We got called when those black students took over Cornell," he recalled. "About 12 or 13 of us went up there and looked around. We took some pictures but not much happened."

He told how various members of his unit in the Domestic Operations Division, all of whom had fixed assignments, would respond to an emergency:

"Suppose we had two infiltrators in the Rudd group and we got a call saying there was trouble. We'd set up a commo [communications] van nearby, with the commo gear and some weapons." [The van also included photographs of the infiltrators for easy spotting.]

Other Activities

"Everyone then had a different job. The back-up people would join the pro-Rudd forces at the demonstration, so now you had people all around Rudd. Their job would be to watch in case something went wrong so they would be able to pull out the infiltrators [who were always C.I.A. men].

"The others would take photo-

tographs. We reported to the van, and I assume that the intelligence was put together there and sent to the New York office and then on to Washington."

The former agent was less eager to discuss other activities that he and his colleagues took part in — such as illegal bugging and break-ins.

A lot of outside wiretaps were not needed, he said, because "if you were on an infiltration and if the phone was in your name, you could get the kids to talk on the phone and give us permission for taps."

When telephone taps were needed, he said, advance authority was always necessary except in emergency situations.

In most cases, he said, the outside wiretaps were put in place only after an informer or infiltrator gave advance word of an important telephone contact that was pending. "If the call was booked—let's say between 10 and 11 at night at some house, you'd intercept the line for only that hour," he said. "But you had to have an inside man who knew when the call was coming."

'A True Situation'

In addition to telephone wiretaps, the former agent said, he and his colleagues occasionally would use sophisticated boom microphones capable of picking up an outside conversation hundreds of feet away.

With a laugh, the former agent noted that he had seen "The Conversation," a recent movie dealing with an electronic snooping expert. "You

know," he said, "I had a funny

feeling that it was describing a true situation."

Physical break-ins were also

used by the domestic C.I.A.

agents, he said, and those, too,

required prior approval from his superiors. The former agent was unable to say whether his superiors, in turn, had to seek higher authority for such activities.

"This was a well-organized

operation," he said: "I reported

back to my superior regularly.

There were times when he

called me regularly at night."

"Those fellows overseas," he

added, speaking of C.I.A. men

posted in foreign countries, "had

a lot more play than we did."

Escaped Police Detection

Asked how the C.I.A. men, with their vans and undercover agents, could escape detection by other police agencies in New York City, the former agent said, "We'd bump into the F.B.I. guys, but they didn't know who we were." He and his colleagues also were under carefully arranged cover, he said, and could produce identification papers showing that they were employees on the current payroll of a New York corporation.

One high-ranking New York City police official, asked yesterday about the former agent's account, acknowledged that he and others in his special unit "had always assumed that the C.I.A. had been involved here."

The official said there were many indirect hints and clues of the C.I.A. activity during the height of the antiwar protests, "but we had nothing hard to go on."



By Oliphant for the Denver Post

WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1974

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

MORE OPEN C.I.A. SOUGHT BY COLBY

Intelligence Director Asserts
He Has a Duty to Explain,
in Part, Agency's Role

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—In the 16 months since he took office as Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby has made more public appearances, spoken to more reporters and testified more often before Congress than any of his predecessors—perhaps more than all of his predecessors put together.

Mr. Colby has said several times on the record that he believes these deliberate efforts to "go public," though seemingly paradoxical for an espionage chief, constitute an essential part of his responsibility as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council last summer, Mr. Colby explained his credo as follows: "We in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be an intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations."

Vietnam, Watergate Influence

Privately, Mr. Colby and his press aides acknowledge that the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate scandal have practically compelled the leadership of the C.I.A. to take defensive steps by letting the public know a bit more about the workings of the agency.

Certain sectors of public opinion held the C.I.A. responsible for both, even though influential figures in the agency warned in Administration counseils against involvement.

Soon after Mr. Colby took command in September, 1973, it became possible for reporters to call the C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. and make appointments for briefings with senior analysts on a wide range of foreign intelligence topics.

In one such "backgrounder," of more than 100, a C.I.A. specialist told a reporter in late August, 1973, that she expected some sort of military coup in Chile within three weeks. The analyst then listed the factors pointing toward a coup, all of which, she noted, were public knowledge.

At the time of the background session, the agency's idea was to demonstrate the expertise of its people. After the coup occurred in Chile on Sept. 11, 1973, however, the C.I.A. was accused of causing the downfall of the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens through actions that were not public knowledge.

Mr. Colby himself began meeting reporters for such briefing

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

Ford Considering Special C.I.A. Panel

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—President Ford has under consideration a proposal to establish a public commission to investigate allegations of illegal domestic surveillance by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The proposal came from Secretary of State Kissinger and others both inside and outside the Administration with a belief that a public forum would help halt the controversy over C.I.A. activities and lay the groundwork for a careful review of the agency's alleged domestic spying operations, according to one informed Government official.

This official said the names of citizens who would serve on a blue ribbon panel already have been discussed, and that he believed that the "people at Vail" (in Colorado where the President is on vacation) would

accept some form of Mr. Kissinger's recommendations. There was no indication here of who might be named to such a panel.

Douglas Called a Target

In another development, Time magazine contended in its latest issue that Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas and former Representative Cornelius Gallagher, Democrat of New Jersey, were among four political figures who were put under C.I.A. surveillance. Time said the others were the late Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat of Missouri and Representative Claude Pepper, a Democrat who was said to have been "apparently suspect because of his contacts with Cuban refugees living in his Congressional district" in Florida.

The Government official said Mr. Kissinger "doesn't have any

idea that he can head off any congressional investigation" with a public commission. "Henry's view, I think is, of course that Congress can investigate as it should, but that doesn't absolve the Administration from investigating itself," he said.

"Obviously, if we did nothing but step back and watch everybody else investigate the C.I.A. without doing something about it ourselves, that would be criticized, too."

Mr. Kissinger apparently relayed his views to President Ford who has with him a 50-page report on allegations of C.I.A. domestic activities from William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. The White House has said that Mr. Ford is considering whether to make public any or all of the report.

sessions early in the autumn of 1973. Recently he estimated that he had talked to more than 132 press representatives in one year.

In addition, Mr. Colby traveled afield to talk with editors and reporters of the Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Sun-Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Star-News and Time and Newsweek magazines.

These talks, too, were on "background," meaning that the information could be used, but not attributed to a specified source. Mr. Colby also gave several interviews on the record.

In addition to his public speech in Los Angeles, he addressed the Fund for Peace Conference devoted to C.I.A. and Covert Actions" last September in Washington. And he spoke to closed groups of citizens interested in foreign policy in New York and Chicago.

In his Washington address entitled, "The View from Langley," Mr. Colby set out something of his philosophy about the C.I.A.'s work and its public image:

"There have been some 'bad secrets' concerning intelligence; their exposure by our academic, journalistic and political critics certainly is an essential part of the workings of our Constitution. There have been some 'non-secrets' which did not need to be secret; I have undertaken a program of bringing these into the open. But I think that responsible Americans realize that our country must protect some 'Good secrets.'

This, he said, was the rationale behind his year-long effort to obtain legislation from the Congress that would impose strong penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence secrets, particularly by former C.I.A. employees.

The effort was prompted in large part by publication of "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," of which the main author was Victor Marchetti, a former agency employee. The C.I.A. sought to obtain a court injunction enforcing 225 deletions of classified secrets, but

NEW YORK TIMES
28 December 1974

CRITIC OF THE C.I.A. IS OUSTED BY SAIGON

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Dec. 27.—A Government spokesman said today that John D. Marks, co-author of the controversial best-seller, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," was expelled from South Vietnam this morning after his name had been discovered on a blacklist maintained by the Ministry of Interior.

The spokesman said that no reason for the blacklisting had been furnished by the ministry. Apparently, he explained, there was "a slip at the airport" when Mr. Marks arrived last Saturday, and immigration officials allowed him to enter the country.

He has been here before—from 1966 to 1968—as a foreign service officer with the American Embassy, and then again a few years ago on a visit as an aide to Senator Clifford P. Case, the New Jersey Republican.

The purpose for his most recent visit, he said, was to do research for a magazine article.

The Government spokesman said that when the Interior Ministry found his name on the list of arriving passengers, an order was issued for his expulsion. Last night, policemen took him and his traveling companion, Barbara Guss, into custody. They then took them to dinner at La Cave, one of Saigon's finer French restaurants, the spokesman said, and put them aboard a flight to Bangkok, Thailand, this morning.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 6 JAN 1975

* * *

The furor over allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency spied illegally on Americans worries friendly foreign governments. Fear is that a congressional investigation may "blow the cover" on activities of foreign undercover agents who have supplied the CIA with leads on U.S. citizens engaged in espionage against their own country.

had to settle for 27 deletions.

Mr. Colby indicated recently that he intended to continue his round of public appearances and his responsiveness to reporters and members of Congress. He and his aides have testified 28 times before 18 congressional committees since he took office.

But in the midst of a controversy during the last week over allegations that the C.I.A. had conducted large-scale spying on American citizens within the country Mr. Colby has thus far elected not to go on record.

WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1974

CIA Spied On Douglas, Time Says

By Austin Scott
Washington Post Staff Writer

At least four U.S. public officials, including Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, have been spied on by the Central Intelligence Agency, Time magazine reported yesterday.

Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), former Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D-N.J.) and the late Sen. Edward Long (D-Mo.), were the others, the magazine said.

Domestic spying is illegal under the 1947 law that set up the CIA. Time said the CIA did it, however, in part because the Federal Bureau of Investigation regularly refused to follow up on CIA requests for surveillance of American citizens.

Time said Douglas came under scrutiny after he had visited the Dominican Republic in the mid 1960s. Gallagher was watched because of his contacts with Dominican Republic officials, the magazine said, Pepper because of his contacts with Cuban refugees in Miami, and Long because of his contacts with representatives of foreign companies in the United States.

Time quoted an unnamed CIA official as denying the report, but the CIA, contacted yesterday, said it would have no comment on the Time story. Douglas, Pepper and Gallagher were not available for comment.

A 1970 report from a special House committee that investigated Douglas after the then House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford called for his impeachment said Douglas apparently was cooperating with the CIA on that Dominican Republic trip. The committee declined to recommend impeachment.

Douglas had gone to the Dominican Republic to set up a literacy project, the report said, and two men associated with him had some connection with the CIA.

Exactly what association they had was left unclear, however, because then CIA Director Richard Helms refused to deliver a secret memorandum bearing on the Douglas case to committee investigators.

Helms has "categorically denied" charges by the New York Times a week ago that the CIA, under his direction from 1966 to 1973, "conducted illegal domestic operations" against opponents of the war in Vietnam.

A report on CIA domestic spying was delivered to the

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

Mr. Helms, an Achiever In a World of Spooks

By DAVID WISE

WASHINGTON — In 1936, Richard McGarragh Helms, then a young reporter for the United Press, managed to interview Adolf Hitler. Over lunch, Mr. Hitler talked for three hours. When asked how he had staged the Nazi party rally at Nuremberg, Mr. Hitler replied that the delegates had been brought in on special trains; this, he added, was perfect practice for the railroads in case of mobilization.

It was an interesting bit of intelligence for a future chief of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Helms liked to recall the incident, and other details of the interview, three decades later, after President Lyndon B. Johnson had named him head of America's intelligence and espionage network.

That appointment as Director of Central Intelligence came on June 18, 1966, capping a long career for Mr. Helms as a "black," or covert operator, for the C.I.A. The selection of Mr. Helms appeared to symbolize the triumph of the career bureaucrat, or professional spy, over the political appointees who have, at times, directed the intelligence agency.

Then Came Watergate

Then came the C.I.A.'s entanglement in Watergate, which raised clouds over both the agency and Mr. Helms. Under still unclear circumstances, President Nixon shipped Mr. Helms off to be Ambassador to Iran. Now the prospect is that Mr. Helms will be questioned by Congressional investigating committees about charges that the C.I.A. has engaged in widespread illegal activities inside the United States.

Mr. Helms had fared much better under President Johnson. Several months before appointing him C.I.A. director, Mr. Johnson invited Mr. Helms to the LBJ Ranch as an overnight guest. There, an odd encounter took place; another, and unexpected guest, at dinner was Senator Eugene McCarthy, a critic of the C.I.A. Mr. McCarthy needled Mr. Helms, asking him whether he could identify the various wines on the table. Mr. Helms could not. "James Bond would have known the answers," Mr. McCarthy commented.

Mr. Helms was not amused, in part because he has tried to avoid any comparison of himself with fictional, gunslinging secret agents. Yet, of all the directors of the C.I.A., Mr. Helms could

President Thursday at his Vail, Colo., vacation retreat by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Meanwhile, in Vail, White House press secretary Ron Nessen said President Ford has read the report prepared for him by CIA Director William F. Colby and will discuss it with him and other officials in Washington before taking further action.

After the meeting with Colby and others, Mr. Ford will have an announcement, the press secretary said.

He would not confirm reports that the President would name a commission similar to the Warren Commission, which investigated the assassi-

most accurately be portrayed by Sean Connery, the celluloid Bond. The word "dapper" springs to mind for Mr. Helms; he is 61, a tall, thin man, with sleek, black hair flecked with gray at the sides. He smokes unfiltered Chesterfields and is an easy conversationalist, civilized and urbane in manner.

Mr. Helms comes from a comfortable, upper-middle-class background. His father, an Alcoa sales executive, retired early and moved to Europe, where Mr. Helms attended prep schools in Switzerland (Le Rosey, in Gstaad) and Germany. He returned to the United States to attend Williams College, from which he was graduated Phi Beta Kappa.

During World War II he served in Europe with the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), C.I.A.'s predecessor. He joined the C.I.A. as a clandestine operator and quickly moved up in the Plans (now Operations) Directorate, the C.I.A.'s covert arm. When Richard M. Bissell was eased out of the agency after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Mr. Helms became head of the Plans Directorate, sometimes known as the C.I.A.'s "department of dirty tricks," serving in that job for three years.

As head of C.I.A., Mr. Helms kept a remarkably low profile despite a series of controversies that beset the agency during his stewardship. Among them were the 1967 disclosures that C.I.A. had pour millions into student groups, business fronts, labor unions and other organizations through foundation fronts; the accusation that a group of Army Green Berets had killed a South Vietnamese agent on oblique orders from the C.I.A., and the revelation that C.I.A. was running a secret war in Laos.

During this same period Mr. Helms privately and repeatedly expressed his concern to visitors about student antiwar demonstrators here at home. The students, Mr. Helms fretted, could get out of hand and threaten the established order in South America they topple governments.

Then came Watergate, and his troubles began when Mr. Nixon tried to use the C.I.A. to prevent the F.B.I. from looking too closely into the Watergate break-in. There is, in particular, a mysterious taped remark by Mr. Nixon to H. R. Haldeman: "Well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things." The nature of those "things," if there were any, may now become clearer.

David Wise is co-author of the book "The Invisible Government."

nation of President Kennedy, to look into reports the CIA has spied on American citizens.

However, he did not deny that this was the President's intention.

Nessen's comment on the President's continuing concern about the matter lent force to reports that the agency had violated the law establishing the CIA which banned domestic activity of all kinds. Nevertheless, Nessen

urged reporters not to jump to conclusions.

Among those with whom the President will discuss the CIA, in addition to Colby, are Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. Nessen said. He indicated there also would be others, but he would not name them.

In urging that no one "harden into fact" what he called newspaper allegations, Nessen said, "The process of finding out what is going on is under way."

Crosby S. Noyes: Which Spy to Guard Us?

It is perhaps a fatal case of moral blindness, but I confess to some difficulty in summoning up a feeling of towering indignation about the alleged activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The charges are plain enough. A number of unnamed "well-placed" government sources have told the New York Times that the CIA a number of years ago carried on a domestic intelligence operation against members of the anti-war movement and other dissident groups. The Times characterizes the operations as "massive," "illegal" and in direct violation of the CIA's charter. It also reports that the alleged operations have been stopped for some time.

Pretty horrendous stuff. Coming on the heels of Watergate, the Chilean episode and all kinds of stories about clandestine dirty tricks, it is exactly the kind of thing to produce the predictable Pavlovian reaction with any certified liberal.

BUT IT IS at least somewhat important to be clear what it is that we are becoming enraged about. It goes without saying that virtually all Americans loathe and de-

test the idea of anyone spying on them, but this is not the issue at all.

The issue, quite simply, is that it was the CIA, rather than the FBI, that was doing the spying. Or rather, if the allegations are true, both agencies were doing it, at perhaps some waste of the taxpayers' money. But since only the FBI has a license to spy on American citizens in their own country, the CIA was poaching on its sister intelligence agency's preserve.

The reason why I can't get very exercised about all this is that, if I have to be under "surveillance" at all, it makes precious little difference to me whether the surveillor works for the FBI or the CIA, or whether both outfits are involved. So far as I know, both are perfectly legal and responsible agencies of the American government. Again, so far as I know, the motives of one are no more or less sinister than those of the other.

SINCE THE United States government has been in the spy business at home and abroad for many years and will remain so, it comes down to a simple matter of jurisdiction. Technically, perhaps, the

domestic operations of the CIA may have been illegal and in violation of its charter, though this is still far from clear. Logically, it is hard to understand that what is accepted as perfectly proper activity on the part of one agency should provoke such a wrath of moral indignation when practiced by another.

If it is true that the CIA collected "files" on 10,000 American citizens over the years, it is quite certain that the FBI has similar files on several hundred times that many. The only difference is that the CIA is supposed to concern itself with counter-intelligence in foreign countries and with Americans only when they are suspected of being involved with foreign intelligence operations.

But in fact, of course, it is not possible to compartmentalize international espionage into neatly separate foreign and domestic intelligence operations. It is quite absurd to say that once a foreign agent enters the United States, he becomes the exclusive responsibility of the FBI, or that the moment he returns home, the CIA resumes sole jurisdiction. At least a certain overlapping of effort is inevitable. And coop-

eration between the two agencies has always been something less than perfect.

IN THE CASE of certain anti-war groups, and with other violent dissidents such as the Black Panthers, a connection with foreign intelligence operations was at one time strongly suspected by both the CIA and the FBI. Both agencies did their best to keep tabs on suspected groups and individuals. And if the CIA at times overstepped its jurisdictional authority, it is not clear that the duplication of effort seriously infringed the rights of the people involved.

In any event, it is ironic that William Colby, the present director of the CIA, is reported to be considering asking the attorney general to take legal action against the culprits in his agency. Former Atty. Gen. William Saxbe, before his resignation, held the strongly expressed view that the FBI should go out of the domestic counter-intelligence business altogether — along with the intelligence agencies of the various armed services—and the whole business be dumped into the lap of the CIA. Which, if you come to think of it, may make more sense than the system we have at this point.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 DEC 1974

Investigating the CIA

Defenders of the Central Intelligence Agency have developed a two-point rebuttal of allegations that the CIA conducted a widespread and illegal domestic intelligence operation against antiwar activists. They argue, first, that domestic spying by the agency is permissible when related to foreign intelligence purposes, and second, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation pushed the CIA into domestic intelligence when the bureau stopped cooperation with the CIA in 1970.

President Ford, relying on the assurances of William E. Colby, the present director of Central Intelligence, says the CIA is not now conducting domestic surveillance.

Richard M. Helms, former director of the CIA, "categorically denied" that the CIA under his tenure conducted any illegal spying in the United States.

Secretary of State Kissinger, the President's chief national security adviser, is reported to have informed Mr. Ford of Helms' denial and the secretary of state is said to feel the matter closed.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House armed services subcommittee on intelligence, said that "information was conveyed to me (by Director Colby) which suggested the overstepping of bounds, but it certainly wasn't of a dimen-

sion . . . of what has appeared in the newspapers."

All this is not good enough. There is no basis to doubt President Ford's sincerity, but how does he know the information submitted to him is accurate? How does Rep. Nedzi know?

James Angleton, the recently resigned counterintelligence chief, said he quit because the agency had become involved in domestic "police-state" activities, but Angleton's disjointed elaboration of that remark, as reported in a telephone interview, seemed to indicate a troubled man.

It is reported that the current CIA director, Colby, revealed in an off-the-record talk that an investigation he ordered into CIA domestic activities had disclosed improprieties, but Colby is said to have added, "I think family skeletons are best left where they are—in the closet."

He is mistaken. The CIA, with an annual budget of \$750 million and 16,000 employees, is not a "family." It is a profoundly important agency with authority to carry out secret operations that affect the security of this nation.

As this newspaper documented nearly a year ago, congressional oversight of the CIA has been almost totally lacking since Congress created the agency 27 years ago. What is needed now is a special inquiry by a select committee of the Congress.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1974

Intelligence 'Oversight' Is Done With A Blindfold

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

WASHINGTON—After the disclosure last week that the Central Intelligence Agency had spied extensively on anti-war groups and other American dissidents, there were quick expressions of outrage on Capitol Hill.

"Immediate and severe action is necessary," said Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin.

"This agency does not have good supervision or review by Congress, or poor review. It actually has no real review at all," said Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri.

Four separate Congressional panels announced hearings for next year, and Senators and Representatives of both parties and various ideologies prepared to sponsor legislation to curb the intelligence agency.

The reaction was not surprising. It was, in fact, predictable.

Every time there has been an intelligence scandal over the last two decades, the response from Congress has been similar. But the expressions of outrage have produced no concrete action.

Congress screamed when the U-2 plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, when the C.I.A. bungled the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, when the agency was shown in 1967 to have infiltrated the National Student Association and countless other American organizations, when the agency's unauthorized operations in Laos were disclosed in 1971 and when its role in ousting the Communist Government in Chile was exposed last year.

More than 200 separate measures designed to make the C.I.A. more responsive to Congress have been introduced in the last quarter century. None has been enacted.

Even the most solid supporters of the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledge that oversight procedures are cursory. Every year, the Senate and House vote to allot money to the agency. But the members of Congress do not know how much money they are allocating or what it will be used for. In fact, they do not even know when they are voting to allocate it.

Nobody Really Knows

The money is hidden in the budgets of various other agencies, and the appropriations are masked in several different funding bills. There is not a line item in any budget or bill that can be identified as applying to the C.I.A. "I do not think there is a man in the legislative part of the Government who really knows what is going on in the intelligence community," says Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee.

Theoretically, the oversight function falls to four small subcommittees of senior, mostly conservative members of

the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees.

They hold their meetings in secret, keep no minutes of them and rarely publish reports. The Intelligence Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee met twice this year. Its counterpart in the House met six times. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee met five times. The House Appropriations Subcommittee reported no records of its meetings.

C.I.A. officials and members of Congress familiar with typical legislative sessions say that the Congressmen generally accept without challenge what they are told by the intelligence agency.

Senator John C. Stennis of Mississippi, who sits on both Senate oversight subcommittees and thus is the single most influential member of Congress on intelligence matters, expressed his view of the role of Congress in this area in a speech on the Senate floor on Nov. 23, 1971. "You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such and shut your eyes some and take what is coming," the Mississippi Senator said.

In the same Senate debate, there was a revealing exchange about C.I.A. operations in Laos between Senator Alan Cranston of California and former Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, who was then chairman of the Appropriations Committee's Intelligence Subcommittee.

Nobody Has Inquired

Cranston: "The chairman stated that he never would have thought of even asking about C.I.A. funds being used to conduct the war in Laos. I would like to ask the Senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that is being done?"

Ellender: "I have not inquired."

Cranston: "You do not know, in fact?"

Ellender: "No."

Cranston: "As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact you are the number one man of the five men who would know, then who would know what happened to this money? The fact is, not even the five men know the facts in the situation."

Ellender: "Probably not."

Following that exchange, the Senate proceeded to vote, 56 to 31, against a measure that would have placed a \$4-billion ceiling on Government spending for intelligence operations.

There is certain to be much activity over the most recent C.I.A. scandal when the new Congress convenes in January. Not only are several sets of hearings planned, but a measure that would create a joint Senate-House committee to review intelligence operations seems to be gaining support and stands a chance of enactment.

The details of the domestic spying are still sketchy. But the allegations are clearly of a different character from those that led to earlier scandals.

It is too early to tell whether the new Congress will be willing to repeal the section of the 25-year-old Central Intelligence Agency Act that permits the agency itself to decide just what Congress and the public should know about C.I.A. activities.

In 1955, the prestigious Hoover Commission, created by Congress to review the executive branch of the Government, declared that the absence of checks and balances raised "the possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosures of costs, organization, personnel and functions are precluded by law."

Congress, thus far, has not heeded the warning.

David E. Rosenbaum is a Washington correspondent for The New York Times.

CIA issue echoes in holidaying Washington

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

CIA spy charges reverberate like shouts in an echo chamber in a Washington with a congressional interregnum and a vacationing President. Developments include:

• Reshuffling of the Central Intelligence Agency's supersensitive counterintelligence branch, which is accused of having conducted domestic spying on Americans in violation of the charter that established the CIA in 1947. Three more high-ranking officials of the branch have resigned, following by a few days resignation of their counterintelligence boss, James Angleton. The three are Raymond Rocca, the division's second in command; Newton S. Miler, chief of operations; and William J. Hood, executive officer.

Officially, the reason given for their resignations is an effort to take advantage of a provision providing higher government pensions, which expires Dec. 31, 1974. But reports circulate in Washington that at issue also was disagreement between these three and CIA Director William Colby over how open the CIA should be in its operations.

• Sen. Clifford P. Case (R) of New Jersey voices his distrust of the CIA and the denials of Richard Helms, now U.S. Ambassador to Iran, who was CIA director in the 1960's when the domestic spying was alleged to have occurred.

Sunday the Senator said he believes Mr. Helms lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during a hearing early in 1973 when he asserted that the CIA had not conducted domestic surveillance. Long a member of the committee, Senator Case will be its senior Republican in the coming Congress. He has maintained since that hearing that there were inconsistencies in the Helms testimony which indicated, Senator Case says, Mr. Helms was not telling the truth.

Case aides said Monday, however, that the Senator does not himself have proof that the CIA did in fact conduct the domestic spying of which it has been accused.

• An allegation by Sen. William Proxmire (D) of Wisconsin that he independently has verified the accuracy of the domestic spying allegations against the CIA. The Senator made his claim Sunday on ABC-TV's



JOHN P. ROCHE

The CIA Affair

Ever since it was verified that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a role in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, I have been waiting for the other shoe to drop. Now — with allegations that the CIA was engaged in domestic counter-intelligence on a substantial scale — that shoe has hit the floor with a resounding thud. Admittedly I had no hard evidence for my suspicion (except the strange fact that all CIA tapes of executive conversations had been "routinely" destroyed just as the lid came off Watergate), but it was a logical by-product of a series of curious coincidences.

Before going into them, let's get the record straight: When the CIA was founded, it was barred from engaging in domestic intelligence activities. In British parlance, the CIA was MI-6, that fascinating collection of characters so well described by John LeCarre. Domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence (MI-5 in Britain) was reserved to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thus if the current charges can be documented, the CIA is in plenty of trouble.

There were at least two major considerations that could have led the CIA to start playing on forbidden turf. Ironically, perhaps the most significant was the refusal of the late J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI to get mixed up in Mr. Nixon's paranoid vision of impending revolution. The former president and his paladins were convinced that the radicals constituted a real threat to American society and that they were subsidized by "The Adversary" (as the polite term puts it). Director Hoover, who was no slouch at discovering conspiracies (usually around budget time), downplayed the radical threat and refused to do any "bag jobs" (burglaries) in search of evidence of foreign subsidization.

This, of course, led to the formation of "The Plumbers" in the White House and their bizarre counter-intelligence schemes. When these were shown to Hoover, he scornfully wrote them off as an amateur hour sponsored by characters who had read too much James Bond. At about this time (1969-70) a very interesting event occurred which didn't make much sense: the FBI literally broke off diplomatic relations with the CIA. In retrospect it would seem that Director Hoover got wind of various White House-CIA scenarios. Both his personal pride (which was immense) and his politi-

cal sense (which was excellent and very much congressionally oriented) told him this was bad news.

Which brings us to the second important point. Hoover was untouchable. A president would have found it easier to destroy the Lincoln Memorial than dislodge the director. One can visualize "The Plumbers" ragging at this antique who suddenly seemed to have got the civil liberties bug. So where do you go next for expert counsel and the necessary playthings? The CIA, which — and this is vital — was not run by a baron, but by a professional who came up on the inside. And Allen Dulles, Walter Bedell Smith or John McCone (to mention three former CIA directors with baronial status) could easily have told the ambitious crew in the basement of the executive office building to run along. While Director Helms must be given the benefit of the doubt, he was a man without a constituency. His power came from his office; the FBI's power came from Hoover's personal status.

The response of Mr. James Angleton, chief of the CIA's counter-intelligence department, when confronted with the charge of operating domestically, was a curious confirmation that something was up. He informed a reporter that the domestic activities of the agency were solely based on material acquired abroad, and then went on to say, "Our source (in Moscow) is still active and still productive; the opposition still doesn't know." This remarkable statement could be either 1) a disinformation gambit based on a recent reading of LeCarre's "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy," or 2) an honest observation that could result in surfacing a "mole" (an agent settled quietly underground) in the KGB. Either way it was hardly what might be called a responsible comment.

It's a shame we don't have the equivalent of a royal commission that could conduct a secret investigation into this whole affair. It has to be explored and, if necessary, cleaned out. The trouble with a public inquisition is that it is likely to go off into an undifferentiated assault on the agency, which would be a disaster. We need a good CIA, and in my experience the intelligence gathering side has been superb. It's the heavies who cause the trouble; but there is a danger that a congressional investigation might throw out the baby with the dirty bath water.

"Issues and Answers."

- Denial by the CIA that it kept a file on Florida Rep. Claude Pepper (D) as charged in Time magazine. Mr. Pepper said CIA Director Colby phoned him to say the CIA was not keeping a file on him.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 December 1974

CIA view: FBI forced its hand

'Hoover spurned requests for spy aid'

By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

During the 1960's the FBI, under the late J. Edgar Hoover, frequently failed to follow up leads the CIA gave it on individual Americans. In particular, the FBI often failed to put under surveillance Americans about whom the CIA raised questions because of their associations with foreigners, according to sources here.

Thus the CIA found itself caught between its view that these Americans needed to be watched at least for a time, and its mandate that it must not engage in domestic spying on U.S. citizens. Sometimes it chose to violate the mandate and did, in fact, engage in domestic surveillance — but not on the massive scale alleged in recent newspaper reports.

This picture emerges from conversations with usually well-informed sources in Congress, and with a former high-level CIA source.

One source described the FBI-CIA impasse this way. During CIA surveillance in other nations, he said, from time to time it would run across American citizens who had been in contact with foreigners the CIA was

watching.

'FBI sometimes balked'

When these Americans returned home, the CIA would pass their names to the FBI for it to keep track of their activities, at least temporarily. But the FBI, under Mr. Hoover, often would refuse to do so, leaving the CIA the alternatives of doing the job itself or having it undone.

On the basis of such reports, much of the spotlight in the several imminent congressional hearings into allegations of CIA surveillance may be diverted to a study of past FBI practices, some sources say.

But part of the attention in the hearings is expected to focus on the question of whether orders for surveillance were being sent from the White House directly to middle-level CIA officials during the Nixon administration — this effectively keeping top CIA officials in the dark about some CIA activities.

No source contacted professes knowledge that such action did occur. But several sources note that in the name of governmental reorganization, the White House placed its own representatives in several government agencies during the second Nixon term.

Given the suspicion attached now to Nixon administration motives and actions, these sources say congressional investigators wonder whether there might have been a major CIA surveillance campaign conducted on White House orders of which top CIA officials were unaware.

It is against this general background that new charges were leveled against the CIA over the weekend. Time magazine said that the CIA undertook surveillance of one Supreme Court justice and three present

or past members of Congress.

The four were: Justice William O. Douglas; Rep. Claude Pepper (D) of Florida; former Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D) of New Jersey; and the late Sen. Edward Long (D) of Missouri. The magazine said the four came under CIA surveillance because of their contacts with citizens or representatives of other nations, including the Dominican Republic and Cuban refugees.

Also over the weekend came a recommendation from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that President Ford name a high-level citizen panel to investigate the CIA situation. If such a board were named it is almost certain that the probes by congressional committees would go forward anyway.

Sen. William Proxmire charges that such a citizen-panel likely would produce a "whitewash." Appearing Sunday on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers," he proposed instead an investigation of the CIA by a "vigorous, independent" investigator and establishment of "a congressional committee with a specific responsibility" for keeping track of CIA activities.

Another major question Congress will probe is: To what extent does federal law permit the CIA to operate inside the U.S. — and in what capacity? The 1947 law which established the organization makes its director "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" — seeing that the spy systems of other nations do not penetrate U.S. intelligence organizations.

It is the CIA's position that any domestic actions were undertaken for this purpose.

JAPAN TIMES
20 December 1974

Ex-CIA Man to Name Colleagues

LONDON (Kyodo-Reuter) — A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) member turned revolutionary socialist said Wednesday that in a book out next month he would name his former colleagues so as to "neutralize them."

Philip Agee, who said he was a field officer for the CIA in Latin America for 10 years, added: "Why should I be delicate with them. These people are promoting fascism around the world."

The 39-year-old Agee was talking on a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) program about the book — "Inside the Company — a CIA Diary."

Reporter Julian Mounter said that since leaving the

agency in 1968 Agee had visited Cuba and now lived in Cornwell, southwest England with a Brazilian woman he said had been tortured for her political beliefs.

In the filmed interview Agee said he had been approached about joining the CIA while still at Notre Dame University. Subsequently he had worked in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico.

He said he was in Quito for three years and listed his most notable successes as bringing about the break in relations between Ecuador and Cuba and fomenting the crack down on the far left which followed the military take over of 1963.

In Uruguay Agee said he had been in charge of operations against Cubans. The agency had an observation post overlooking the Cuban Embassy and took photographs of all those entering. They also tapped the embassy telephones.

In an aside Agee said that at some CIA stations conversations in the gardens of the Soviet embassies were filmed and the film played back to Russian lip readers. This was done because it was well known that the most secret conversations took place in the gardens.

Agee said that during this time he was "turning off" to his work and listed one reason as his hearing a man he had had arrested being tor-

tured at a police station.

"The police officer kept turning up the radio to drown the moans," he said.

Agee said that in Uruguay and Ecuador his cover had been as a civilian employee of the Department of the Air Force. In Mexico he posed as a United States Olympic athlete, arriving some 18 months before the 1968 games and trying to recruit prospective agents.

He claimed that since his resignation the agency had tried to discredit him as an alcoholic. Agee also said that while he was at a secret address in Paris the CIA had planted a bugged typewriter on him so they could discover where he was living.

NEW YORK TIMES
39 December 1974

3 MORE AIDES QUIT IN C.I.A. SHAKE-UP; FACED TRANSFERS

Resign Week After Angleton
Left Amid an Uproar Over
Reports of Spying in U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—Three more high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency resigned last week in a major shake-up of the agency's counterintelligence division, well-informed Government sources said today.

Their resignations, officially to take place at the close of the year Tuesday, came within a week of that of James Angleton, the long-time C.I.A. counterintelligence chief who has been linked to widespread domestic spying in disclosures reported by the New York Times.

The Government sources said the newly retired officers, whose resignations were accepted without objection by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, are Raymond Rocca, Mr. Angleton's chief deputy; William J. Hood, executive officer of the Counterintelligence Division, and Newton S. Miller, chief of operations.

Proxmire Is Convinced

In a related development, Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, said today that he had received independent verification of the allegations of C.I.A. domestic spying that were initially published Dec. 22 in the Times. There has been no official denial or confirmation of The Times's account from the Ford Administration.

"I can say on the basis of the information I have and I think it is very good information," Mr. Proxmire said on "Issues and Answers," the ABC-TV interview show, "that the stories and the allegations in The New York Times about the file of 10,000 names of people who had been under investigation by the C.I.A., about the surveillance, about the breaking and entering and about wiretaps, that those are accurate and correct."

On Dec. 22, The Times quoted well-placed government sources as saying that the intelligence agency had violated its charter during the Nixon Administration by mounting a massive,

illegal intelligence operation against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States. Intelligence files on at least 10,000 American civilians were compiled, the sources said.

In today's issue, The Times also quoted a former undercover C.I.A. agent as saying that much of the spying against radicals had been conducted by members of the highly secret Domestic Operations Division of the agency.

Authoritative intelligence sources acknowledged in interviews today that Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Division had played a separate role from that of the Domestic Operations Division. But both divisions, the sources said, were determined during a review last year to have operated illegally inside the United States.

It could not be learned whether Mr. Colby had initiated any punitive steps against officials of the Domestic Operations Division, which has offices in more than a dozen cities in the United States. Government sources did say, however, that the sudden resignation of the three remaining top deputies of the Counterintelligence Division was a direct result of Mr. Colby's decision not to promote any of them after Mr. Angleton's resignation.

Mr. Colby had informed the men, each with agency careers spanning more than two decades, that they were being transferred from counterintelligence work—a decision Mr. Colby apparently made only after the published accounts of illegal C.I.A. domestic activity by the agency.

By retiring before Dec. 31, a number of Government officials noted today, the three former counterintelligence officials could increase their pensions by roughly 7 per cent a year.

"Obviously, with these retirements," one well-informed official said, "Colby'll have a chance to change the tone of the leadership in counterintelligence—to get a new generation in there."

All three men, along with Mr. Angleton, are known to believe that the United States has lost the incentive and initiative in its efforts to combat Soviet intelligence efforts. They also are known to believe that agents of the K.G.B., the Soviet secret intelligence service, have found it easier to penetrate and work against American society.

In a brief telephone interview today, Mr. Miller confirmed that he had resigned, but denied that his action was related to the furor over domestic spying.

Asked whether he was concerned about foreign espionage, Mr. Miller said:

"There's a very real need for concern, but I don't think people are going to heed it. I don't think they want to heed it."

"I'll suggest this," Mr. Miller added. "A lot of people are

retiring not just because of what was published a week ago but in terms of what's going on against the agency and against the institutions of government."

Some of the complaints "are justified," he said, "some of them aren't justified."

The State Department's Biographic Register lists Mr. Miller as being 48 years old and a native of Iowa, who served with the C.I.A. in Bangkok and Addis Ababa.

Mr. Rocca, reached by telephone this afternoon at his home, refused to comment on his retirement, referring a caller to the agency's public information office. No listing could be found for him in recent editions of the Biographic Register.

Mr. Hood could not be reached today. He is described in the register as being 54 years old and a native of Maine; he did C.I.A. work in Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt and Bern.

Some Feel Maligned

One intelligence official characterized the three retiring counterintelligence officers as feeling maligned by the recent accounts of domestic spying. In particular, the official said, the men are known to believe that much more spying and

other illegal activity were conducted by the Domestic Operations Division than by the agents in counterintelligence, who were said to have concentrated more on keeping track of Soviet and other foreign espionage personnel.

The precise relationship inside the C.I.A. between the Domestic Operations Division and the Counterintelligence Division—as far as domestic spying was concerned—could not be determined. Both divisions are part of the agency's clandestine services, the so-called "dirty tricks" department that normally concerns itself only with foreign operations.

In his television interview, Senator Proxmire urged the establishment by Congress of an independent special prosecutor with subpoena powers "who will prosecute every illegal action by C.I.A. agents, past or present."

While praising the efforts of Mr. Colby, Senator Proxmire also criticized the Ford Administration's decision to permit Mr. Colby as the C.I.A. chief to investigate the charges of domestic spying. The White House is expected to make a statement this week on a 50-page report by Mr. Colby, which was submitted last week to the President at Vail, Colo.

WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1974

3 More Officials Quit CIA

Top Command Of Accused Division Out

Three more top officials have resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency's counterintelligence division, which has been named in published reports as conducting domestic spying.

Their resignations combined with that of James J. Angleton, chief of CIA's counterintelligence division, removes the entire top command of the division.

The men resigning are: Raymond Rocca, 57, Angleton's deputy; William J. Hood, 54, executive officer; and Newton S. Miller, 48, chief of operations.

All three men confirmed they were resigning, but insisted they were doing so to take advantage of extra retirement benefits available to persons who leave the gov-

ernment before the end of the year.

The agency's mandatory retirement age is 65, though it urges its personnel to leave earlier.

CIA Director William E. Colby acknowledged the resignations last night, and also attributed them to the enhanced retirement benefits. He refused to comment on whether the departures were related to the domestic charges.

Several sources, however, said the resignations stemmed from three factors other than retirement benefits, the Associated Press reported. One source said allegations of domestic spying played a role in the resignations.

Several sources said the counterintelligence division had two major policy disagreements with Colby and higher policy officials, the wire service said.

The disagreements were said to be over interpretation of events and intentions in the Soviet bloc and over Colby's policy of making the agency more open. The men in counterintelligence were more suspicious of Russian moves toward detente than their superiors and felt Colby's openness had damaged the agency.

According to one source, the counterintelligence staff was particularly upset when Colby debated Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers, at a panel sponsored by a private group critical of the CIA.

Angleton's resignation was requested by Colby 10 days

ago, Angleton has denied that his operation conducted any illegal domestic intelligence gathering.

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said yesterday that he has information that the CIA spied on American citizens in this country, engaged in breaking and entering and in wiretapping.

The charges that the CIA breached legal prohibitions intended to confine its operations to foreign intelligence, Proxmire said, "are accurate and correct" according to "very reliable people" who are his private sources.

Proxmire said in a television interview ("Issues and Answers"—ABC, WMAL—that he independently verified to his satisfaction the allegations initially published by The New York Times on Dec. 22. He said his information confirms that CIA files contain names of 10,000 Americans who "had been under investigation by the CIA," that the agency engaged in domestic "surveillances," in "breaking and entering" and "wiretaps" of Americans.

When the initial charges were aired a week earlier, Proxmire called for the resignation of Richard M. Helms, who was CIA director from 1966 to 1973. This is the period when the alleged domestic spying took place, primarily among opponents of the war in Vietnam. Helms, presently ambassador to Iran, "categorically denied" last week that the CIA, when he headed it, "conducted illegal domestic operations against antiwar activists or dissidents or that any unit to do so was created" during his service as director.

In an additional report yesterday, The New York Times said a former CIA agent, not identified by name, said New York in the late 1960s was a center of spying on radical groups. Agents working for the CIA's Domestic Operations Division, the account said, infiltrated radical organizations and participated in break-ins and wiretapping. The Times' source said he received from the CIA "more than 40" psychological assessments of radical leaders to assist in surveillance of the targeted groups.

Other sources said yesterday that the CIA had at least two sections operating on the domestic scene: a Domestic Contact Service, until recently relatively "overt" by CIA

standards, collecting foreign intelligence from businessmen, students and others traveling abroad, and the clandestine Domestic Operations Division. The latter network was originally established with offices in many cities to collect foreign intelligence inside the United States from emigre groups and other sources and to coordinate CIA "covert" organizations. It allegedly expanded into the activities now under challenge.

This may be the basis for Helms' contention that no unit "was created" for the purpose of spying on antiwar activists and his denial that the CIA "conducted illegal domestic operations" for that purpose. It is the standard CIA contention that nothing it does is illegal, on grounds that it acts only on the basis of authorizations by the President or the National Security Council, as permitted by its charter.

In his TV appearance, Proxmire called on Congress to establish "an independent prosecutor with subpoena powers" to establish the facts and "prosecute every illegal action by CIA agents past or present." He also called for a joint Senate-House committee to oversee the CIA effectively, and for a ban on all covert CIA operations, "the so-called paramilitary activity, the murders, the kidnaps, that kind of thing; to destabilize, overthrow governments."

Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) said in Miami yesterday that CIA Director Colby assured him yesterday that there was no foundation to a Time magazine report that Pepper was spied on by the CIA.

That report said that Pepper, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, former Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D-N.J.) and the late Sen. Edward Long (D-Mo.) all came under CIA scrutiny.

Justice Douglas declined to make any comment yesterday.

President Ford has said through his spokesman at Vail, Colo., where he is spending the holidays, that he will not make decisions on a 50-page report about the allegations concerning the CIA, submitted by Colby, until he meets with senior officials after his return to Washington on Thursday. The President is scheduled to confer with Colby, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, and others. Former CIA Director Helms is also expected in Washington at that time.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 December 1974

Hunt Tells of Early Work For a C.I.A. Domestic Unit

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 — E. Howard Hunt Jr., a Watergate burglar who pleaded guilty, told the Senate Watergate committee last year in still unpublished testimony that he served as the first chief of covert action for the Central Intelligence Agency's Domestic Operations Division.

Mr. Hunt, testifying before the Senate investigators in closed session on Dec. 18, 1973, revealed that his domestic activities included the secret financing of a Washington news agency as well as the underwriting of the popular Fodor's travel guides.

A copy of Mr. Hunt's testimony before the Watergate committee, marked "confidential," was made available today to The New York Times.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Hunt said that he spent about four years working for the Domestic Operation Division, beginning shortly after the unit was set up by the CIA in 1962.

Mr. Hunt, who is now free and living in Miami pending the appeal of his Watergate conviction, denied any involvement or knowledge of domestic spying on radicals and other dissidents by the Domestic Operations Division. But he said that some of his projects from 1962 to 1966—which dealt largely with the subsidizing and manipulation of the news and publishing organizations—did seem to violate the intent of the agency's charter.

The New York Times, quoting a former undercover agent for the Domestic Operations Division, said in Sunday editions that the agent was directly involved in the monitoring of antiwar dissidents and radical groups in New York City beginning with the student uprisings at Columbia University in 1968.

Mr. Hunt's testimony suggests that questionable domestic activities by the CIA had apparently begun under the Kennedy Administration, continued during the Johnson Administration and, as well-informed sources have told The Times, reached a peak during the antiwar outbursts in opposition to President Nixon's Vietnam policy.

The Times also reported Sunday that the new domestic unit was formed in 1964, but Mr. Hunt recalled that it was assembled shortly after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation

connected with that failure were shunted into the new domestic unit, Mr. Hunt said.

Today, the Times, quoting well-informed sources, reported that three more former high-level officials of the CIA's counterintelligence division had resigned, effective tomorrow, following the revelations earlier this month of massive domestic operations by the agency. The sudden retirement of James Angleton, director of the counterintelligence division, was made known last week.

Comment Is Refused.

The White House and CIA refused today to discuss the reported shake-up in the counterintelligence division.

"Whatever is happening at the CIA, the President is being kept informed of it," mon Nessen, the White House press secretary, told newsmen at Vail, Colo.

The three newly retired CIA men—Raymond Rocca, Mr. Angleton's chief deputy; William J. Hood, executive officer of the counterintelligence division, and Newton S. Miller, chief of operations—are reliably known to believe that much more spying and other illegal activities were conducted by the Domestic Operations Division than by counterintelligence agents.

Precisely what role the Domestic Operations Division did play in the domestic spying could not be immediately learned.

Mr. Hunt, in his Senate testimony, told of being ordered to arrange for the daily pick-up of "any and all information" that might be available in 1964 at the Presidential campaign headquarters of Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, then running against President Johnson. The Goldwater documents, Mr. Hunt said, were to be delivered to a White House aide, Chester L. Cooper, a former CIA official.

"I was opposed to this as a Goldwater Republican," Mr. Hunt testified. "I was told that it didn't make any difference, that President Johnson had ordered this activity and that Cooper would be the recipient of the information."

Asked by telephone today about that operation, Mr. Hunt said he had been "shocked by this intrusion into Barry Goldwater's affairs."

"But I did it," he said, "and you must know my thinking on this. Since I'd done it once before for the CIA, why wouldn't I do it again [inside Watergate in June, 1972] for the White House?"

The Domestic Operations Division has received little public attention, although its existence was revealed in 1967 by the Washington journalists, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, in their book, "The Espionage Assignment."

In the interview, Mr. Hunt

31 December 1974

Spying for Liberty

By Tom Wicker

said that there was strenuous opposition to its establishment in 1962, particularly from Richard Helms, who later became the C.I.A. director, and Thomas H. Karamessines, who later became the agency chief of clandestine operations.

Mr. Hunt, who retired in 1970 after serving more than 20 years with the C.I.A., told the Watergate committee that the domestic operations division had "established field stations in Boston and Chicago and San Francisco, to name a few cities. These were parallel to the extent overt C.I.A. establishment [already set up those cities] and a large variety of domestic based operations were conducted by this division."

"My staff ran a media operation known as Continental Press out of the National Press Building in Washington," Mr. Hunt added. "We funded much of the activities of the Frederick D. Praeger Publishing Corporation in New York City. We funded, to a large extent, the activities of Fodor's Travel Guide, distributed by the David McKay Corporation."

No listing for Continental Press could be found in the current Washington telephone directory and Mr. Hunt recalled during today's telephone conversation that the news agency was used mostly to supply news articles—or propaganda—to foreign clients.

Kenneth L. Rawson, the president and editor of the David McKay Company, Inc., said in a telephone conversation from his home tonight that in the years referred to by Mr. Hunt his company simply distributed the Fodor guides published then by Fodor's Modern Guides, Inc.

Mr. Rawson said he had no knowledge of Mr. Hunt's allegations or of any outside financing of the guides' publication in the early nineteen-sixties. In 1968, Mr. Rawson reported, McKay bought Mr. Fodor's publishing company and became publisher as well as distributor of the guides.

The C.I.A.'s link to the Praeger Publishing Company became known early in 1967 and Mr. Praeger acknowledged then that his concern had published "15 or 16 books" at the suggestion of the agency.

The C.I.A.'s involvement with the publication of the Fodor's travel book series had not been publicly known before today.

It was this operation, Mr. Hunt testified last December, that distressed him.

"I was not a fan of the idea," he said. "I thought that it was (A) unnecessary; Fodor and McKay didn't need the money; and (B) that it was an improper extension of C.I.A. activity into the domestic field."

In response to a question a moment later, Mr. Hunt depicted Fodor's Travel Guides, Inc., as a former agent for the C.I.A. in Austria. The C.I.A. chief of station in Austria, Mr. Hunt said, "had undertaken to help him form his publishing organization, and it continued on through the years—I suppose a matter of 12 to 15 years."

The evidence appears to be growing that the Central Intelligence Agency violated its charter and broke the law by conducting domestic surveillance within the United States. Since that charge was made in The New York Times Dec. 22, President Ford has said that he had some of the same information on which The Times story was based, and:

"Four C.I.A. counterintelligence officials have resigned, obviously with the concurrence of William E. Colby, director of the agency, and one of them, James Angleton, said of The Times story, 'there's something to it.'

Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin said on ABC's "Issues and Answers" that he had independent confirmation of The Times story.

A former C.I.A. agent confided some elaborate details of domestic spying to Seymour Hersh of The Times.

Richard Helms, C.I.A. director at the time of the alleged domestic spying, issued a "categorical" denial that, in fact, appeared to depend heavily on how the word "illegal" might be defined and on whether the spying was aimed specifically at "antiwar activists or dissidents."

Watergate fans will remember that these seemingly insignificant semantic usages are not unimportant. A political "dissident" who was also suspected by the C.I.A. of being in touch with a foreign power might be classified as a security threat, not a dissident; and "illegal" spying might not seem at all illegal to the security mentality—for example, spying on an American "antiwar activist" if it was thought that this might be part of the agency's need to keep a counterintelligence check on its own agents.

Even granting such "gray areas" and the obvious difficulties of knowing precisely who is a "dissident" and who is a paid foreign agent, it may well be asked why the C.I.A. would commit—in Representative Lucien Nedzi's phrase—"illegalities in terms of exceeding their charter." Why not, instead, confide the problems to a Congress that has usually been friendly and ask for appropriate legislation?

One reason no doubt was the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation regards itself as having the official counterintelligence mission. Especially during the lifetime of the formidable J. Edgar Hoover, had the C.I.A. sought either to cut into the F.B.I. turf or to imply that the F.B.I. was not doing the job, Mr. Hoover's wrath and vengeance would have been terrible to behold, certainly not to have been lightly courted.

More important, however, is the kind of personal outlook and world view that—understandably enough—is al-

"We'd undergo his losses," Mr. Hunt said, "and he was on the C.I.A. payroll and may still be for all I know."

Mr. Fodor, a native Hungarian who became an American citizen in 1942 could not be reached for comment at his home or office in Litchfield, Conn.

In a related development, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey,

most inevitably developed by those who spend their lives in the national security field. This security mentality produces, first, a kind of tunnel vision—a narrow and constant focus on the most frightening and threatening aspect of international relations. Mr. Hoover, for example, singlehandedly obstructed for many years an increase in the number of Soviet consulates in this country; he believed they increased the Soviet intelligence threat, and he seemed to have no sense at all of any need for improving Soviet-American relations.

The very nature of the job also tends to exaggerate the threat, hence the response. One who regards himself as responsible for something as cosmic as the national security is likely to assume the worst case. If it is possible that the Soviets will build a hundred missiles rather than ten, better assume

IN THE NATION

the hundred, and build 200; if it is possible that a black radical is being paid by the Algerians, through whom the Soviets may control or exploit him, better keep him under surveillance, however "illegal" it might be on paper.

Such a world, moreover, especially when most of its activities are carried out in secrecy, is bound to create a heightened sense of power. Who can do "wrong" in protecting an innocent nation from threats it does not recognize? The legitimating of "cover"—acting secretly—makes it unlikely that anyone will be caught, anyway. As the Nixon White House all too well demonstrated, the responsibility for "national security" and the power to act in secret can be a heady and corrupting combination.

The national security mentality also seems to believe that the nation can be something different from what it does. Governments can be toppled, foreign officials assassinated or subverted, armies recruited and launched on invasions, all clandestinely and under cover of lies—but none of that has anything to do with what the country is, or what it stands for. These "black" deeds, in fact, permit the United States, in a hostile world, to remain the bastion of freedom, the home of democracy, an open society standing for honor and decency among nations.

"There's a very real need for concern" about foreign intelligence, said one of the C.I.A. officials who retired, "but I don't think people are going to heed it. I don't think they want to heed it." So Big Brother had to do the job for them, through secret and illegal spying. By the curious double standard of the security world, that was not a threat to American liberty but a means of protecting it.

Democrat of Minnesota, announced today that he would introduce legislation when Congress convenes next month to create a permanent Joint Committee on National Security to oversee intelligence operations.

"The time has come for Congress to face up to a responsibility it has shirked for too many years," he said in a statement issued from his office in Minneapolis.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
30 DEC 1974

Domestic spying

... and we can survive the CIA

By HARRIET VAN HORNE

NEW YORK—Economically, the year just ending has been a bruiser, the worst in 40 years. We've all acquired new anxieties and frustrations to add to the old.

A bad year? No year can be all bad that sees the lid finally blown from the most sinister agency in the U.S. government, the CIA.

That the CIA has been engaged in domestic surveillance for several years will astonish nobody who was involved in the antiwar movement. The common saying "We almost became a police state under Nixon" is rendered naive and inaccurate now. We were a police state, with the CIA and the FBI keeping dossiers on honorable citizens engaged in peaceful, legal activities.

The activities were suspect simply because they dissented from established government policy. That's how the system works in the Soviet Union, too.

How tawdry and paranoid the CIA looks today! These agents trained so rigorously in the arts of espionage, bound by oath to protect this innocent land from foreign menace, apparently devoted much of their time to tapping telephones of draft resisters. They also opened the mail of people opposed to the Vietnamese war and snooped into the bank records of anybody who wrote a check in the name of peace.

Our chief protection against the CIA, the FBI and the devious schemes of the Nixon White House has been the Fourth Amendment. With Watergate giving Americans a new awareness of



"... So I said to the tree, 'Tree,' I said, 'I won't tolerate anything like this!' and that was that."

civil liberties, and with both the CIA and the FBI now obligated to moderate their spooky "Papa Doc" methods, we may all feel a little more secure in our "persons, houses, papers and effects."

Doubtless the CIA will now undergo a congressional investigation. The scandal, one feels, has only just begun. But the "spy mentality" would seem to be incurable, a sickness in the personality. This is borne out by the remark of the CIA director, William E. Colby. "I think family skeletons are best left where they are — in the closet," said he.

For too many years, our leaders have felt that they had the right to manipulate the public in the name of

"national security." What rubbish! The truth ultimately must come out.

In his book, "The Politics of Lying," David Wise observed, "The excuse for secrecy and deception most frequently given by those in power is that the American people must sometimes be misled in order to mislead the enemy. This justification is unacceptable on moral and philosophical grounds, and often it simply isn't true. Frequently the 'enemy' knows what is going on, but the American public does not."

Walter Lippmann, that good, wise man, wrote, "There is no more right to deceive than there is a right to swindle, cheat or to pick pockets." Mr. Colby, it's time to let us see those skeletons.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JANUARY 1975

Colby Said to Confirm C.I.A. Role in U.S.

Ford Is Reported Told
That Agency Retained
Files About Citizens

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31.—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Ford that its agents maintained thousands of files on American citizens and participated in a wide-ranging program of electronic surveillances, break-ins and the surreptitious inspection of mail inside the United States, well-placed Government sources said today.

The sources said that William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, did not pro-

vide any specific instances of wrongdoing in his report on the spying allegations that was submitted to the President last week, but instead listed the domestic activities by category.

Mr. Colby's report, the sources said, reflected the fact that it had been ordered by the President in response to the spying allegations reported on Dec. 22 in The New York Times. "The report says that The New York Times charges this or that, and then says here are the facts," one source noted, adding that the C.I.A. document seemed to be limited only to those areas of wrongdoing outlined in the initial Times dispatch.

"While I thought your article exaggerated the importance of the issue," the source said, "basically it was correct."

In its Dec. 22 report, The Times quoted well-placed sources as saying that the C.I.A. had violated its charter by mounting a massive intelligence operation in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States. Intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were compiled, the sources were quoted as saying.

The Los Angeles Times said today that Mr. Colby's report acknowledged that the C.I.A. kept files on more than 9,000 Americans and stated that there were at least three illegal break-ins.

The New York Times's sources confirmed that ac-

Colby had also told the President of electronic surveillances and the surreptitious opening of mail. The report did not say specifically whether the electronic surveillances involved bugging or wire-tapping or both.

In each case, however, the sources said, the Colby report did not say who was targeted inside the United States and for what reason. "It just said that there was X number of files and X number of break-ins," a source said.

In the case of the mail covers, which have not been used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since the mid-nineteen-sixties, the source said, Mr. Colby stated that the operations were approved in advance by various Attorneys General or Postmasters General.

No such contention was made for the break-ins and buggings, the source said. Some of the illegal domestic activities are known to have taken place as

long as 20 years ago.

"Asked whether he considered the Colby report to be complete, one source who has had first-hand access to the document, said, "That depends on what you mean by complete."

"What it does," he added, "is go into some detail on some of the charges in The Times."

"Basically Colby doesn't attempt to justify what was done," the source explained. "He just lays out the facts."

"Not the End-All"

Asked further whether the report appeared to be a satisfactory response, the source said, "It's satisfactory only insofar as it gives a factual description of the allegation in the first Times article."

"Clearly," the source said, "this [the Colby report] is not the end-all to the investigation. Obviously, there are questions left to be answered."

The Times's sources also described the C.I.A. report as being far less voluminous than was indicated by published reports last week. Those reports, which were not challenged by officials in the White House press office, depicted the Colby

document as being more than 50 pages in length with various appendices.

In fact, the sources said, the document included a number of papers and materials not directly pertinent to the charges of domestic spying, and it was those pages that added to its bulk.

The sources further expressed bafflement over the concern expressed last week by the White House over the possible problems for some foreign countries that would result from publication of the Colby report. "This is only a problem for foreign governments in terms of 'Here's another example of how we can't keep our mouths shut,'" one official said.

Earlier today, The Associated Press quoted what it said was a senior adviser to President Ford as saying that he understood that the Colby document

substantially supported the allegations reported in The New York Times.

Those allegations have resulted in calls for at least four investigations by the next Congress, which convenes in two weeks. In addition, some Senators and officials have urged formation of a special prosecutor's office to investigate and possibly bring criminal charges

President Ford, who received the Colby report Friday while on his ski-work visit to Vail, Colo., has made it known that he will not discuss the report or the C.I.A. until after his return to Washington Thursday. Mr. Ford will meet then with Secretary of State Kissinger and Mr. Colby to determine what steps to take.

At least four high-ranking former C.I.A. officials, all members of the counterintelligence division, which was alleged to have participated in the illegal

activities, have resigned since the initial Times story.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, setting up the C.I.A., the intelligence agency was explicitly barred from internal security functions, even in the case of foreign espionage. That function was to be left to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In a related development, Vice President Rockefeller told newsmen today in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where he is vacationing, that the C.I.A. or any other institution that breaks the law should be punished.

But the newly confirmed Vice President added that the "C.I.A. is in Mr. Kissinger's area and I don't intend to interfere." Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Kissinger

have been vacationing with their wives since last week at the Dorado Beach Hotel in San Juan.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 December 1974

Let's think

The CIA faces cleanup

By Erwin D. Canham

One more institution of the cold war — the Central Intelligence Agency — is surely on the way to drastic change. And about time.

We all know that centralized intelligence gathering is a necessary part of government responsibility in a world of grave adversary relationships. There has not been much criticism, and quite a lot of praise, for the overseas intelligence-gathering operations of the CIA.

The trouble has been with its "dirty tricks" — its direct interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. And now the trouble is with its alleged intelligence-gathering operations inside the United States, strictly in violation of the law setting up the CIA.

Soon we may know in more detail of the government's side in the charges that the CIA grossly violated its charter inside the United States. Already the stern injunctions of President Ford that such activities must not go on is a partial admission that they have taken place in the past.

Plan aborted

It is already on the public record that the CIA took some part in drafting the nefarious Huston plan in 1970 for various illegal activities. Fortunately, the plan was soon aborted, but the attitudes behind it persisted in the administration and ultimately brought the Nixon presidency to the ground.

At the least, following full in-

vestigation, Congress ought to set up more adequate supervision of the CIA. Two branches of government ought to be involved, with knowledge, in such grave activities. The present information available to Congress is limited to a few, and shrewdly scattered among divided committees. The long-proposed joint House-Senate committee on intelligence oversight should be set up without delay.

The abuse of domestic intelligence operations was once widespread in the United States, and not limited to the CIA. Horrifying details of the activities of military intelligence have come to light, and presumably have been stopped. In the 1960's, particularly, various branches of government pushed their spying on the antiwar movement deep into private activities which have long been sanctioned by the American Constitution.

Detection essential

This does not mean that domestic subversion should not be detected, exposed, and when justified prosecuted by the law. That is the role of the FBI, and of the courts. Nor need we be naive about the necessary techniques of detective work. Distasteful as they are, impersonations and penetration by agents and use of stool pigeons have long been accepted. But the courts attempt to

draw certain lines, such as against unauthorized wiretapping, and these should be enforced.

The United States will need international information-gathering of a clandestine nature. It will need a strong FBI at home. But the sooner it is decided that CIA activities involving direct interference in the internal affairs of foreign nations are far more harmful than good, the better it will be.

Redefinition needed

The CIA has been "blown" anyway. Books and articles by its former members have had a devastating effect. A very thorough housecleaning and redefinition of function is in order. Maybe, too, we can save a lot of money.

But it is not necessary to forget the essential patriotic role played during these last three decades by the cloak-and-dagger people. In wartime, as revelations continue to bring out, they performed heroically. In peacetime, the ambiguity began. In cold-war time the role was easily abused. It can only be benefited by rethinking.

We are emerging from a confused period. The fresh air is beginning to blow. The line between what is legitimate and necessary in a free society, and what is not, is coming clear. A sense of proportion, which may be the most essential force in protecting freedom, is on its way back. So the CIA will be reformed.

WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1974

CIA Report Said to Verify Charges

By Jack Nelson
Los Angeles Times

A report prepared by CIA Director William E. Colby for President Ford substantiates allegations that the agency has engaged in illegal domestic spying on American citizens, an informed government source said yesterday.

The source told the Los Angeles Times his information was that the Colby report shows that the CIA kept records on more than 9,000 Americans. He said he got his information from a CIA official who had access to the report.

"My information is that the report also confirms allegations that the CIA engaged in other clandestine domestic activities, including at least three illegal entries," the

source said. "Two of the entries were against former CIA employees suspected of slipping over to the other side." [The law authorizing the CIA states that the director "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.]

The 50-page Colby report was prepared on orders of Mr. Ford after The New York Times reported that the CIA had engaged in massive illegal domestic spying during previous administrations. It was delivered to the President Friday in Vail, Colo., where he is on a skiing vacation.

Mr. Ford has said he will not discuss the report or the CIA until after his return to Washington Thursday.

In another development, Reps. Phillip Burton (D-Calif.) and Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.) said that when Congress reconvenes Jan. 14 they will

introduce legislation to establish a special prosecutor's office and a select congressional committee to investigate allegations against the CIA.

Burton, chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, said the legislation also will be aimed at modifying the CIA's 1947 charter to strengthen its prohibitions against domestic spying by the agency.

In Vail, White House press secretary Ron Nessen refused to say whether the resignations of four top CIA counterintelligence officers in recent days were linked to the allegations of domestic spying.

"If there is a CIA shakeup, has the President had any hand in it?" a reporter asked.

"He is not aloof from the topside of CIA," Nessen replied. "I can assure you he is aware of what is going on at CIA."

The Associated Press.

meanwhile, reported it had learned that the name of at least one of the officers—counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton—was mentioned in "one draft" of the Colby report that went to the President.

Angleton, who has denied any involvement in illegal activities, was identified by The New York Times as overseer of the domestic spy operation.

[Also yesterday Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, (D-Minn.) said he will ask Congress to create a permanent Joint Committee on National Security to oversee covert intelligence gathering operations.

[Humphrey said the proposed committee, composed of senior members of the House and Senate, would review all major national security issues and exercise a continuing oversight of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.]

WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1974

Tom Braden

CIA: 'A Service, Not a Weapon'

From its inception, the chief problem of the Central Intelligence Agency has been confusion of purpose. By definition, intelligence is a service. But the creation of a U.S. intelligence service was sold to the country and the Congress as a weapon with which fight communism. The two are not identical goals and the confusion is illustrated in the career of James Angleton who resigned the other day as chief of the agency's counter espionage effort.

CIA Director William Colby requested Angleton's resignation following charges that he had conducted illegal domestic operations. But Colby was ready. In the view of many CIA employees Angleton had become a mixed up man.

Back in the late '40s he was the ideal choice for the counter espionage work to which the late Frank Wisner assigned him. Painstaking, suspicious, quick to note deviations from the norm, he had the kind of mind one associates with the classic detective.

In addition, as those of us who were with him in CIA may recall, he had a capacity for empire building. From the end of world War II until last week, he built his power within the agency to the point where he was virtually untouched.

Successive directors, newly come to the pinnacle, were fascinated at their first encounter with this bespectacled, scholarly looking figure with the stooped shoulders, who walked cat-like into the office, and when the door was closed, introduced himself with some startling and calculated revelation.

"I think you'll be interested in this," he would begin with a chuckle, and then proceed to tell his new boss exactly what his new boss's hostess had said about him after the new boss had departed her house on the previous evening.

Or he would show the new boss a copy of a private letter written by some employee or agent on the subject of the new boss. It was heady stuff, acquired by such means as the rest of us may imagine, but which only Angleton knew. A fly fisherman by hobby, he often referred to his knowledge of the personal and private as the result "of a little fishing."

With one director of CIA, himself a fly fisherman, Angleton established such rapport that the two talked of secret matters in terms of fly tying: "I caught it on a little brown bug with long antenna." Many people in CIA feared Angleton as much as successive directors held him in awe.

So his success was great, and not only in terms of power. His job was spelled out in the agency's charter: "to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." CIA is the only major intelligence service in the world which, so far as is

known, has never employed a "mole," to use John Le Carre's description of the traitor in the midst. It is a fact of which Angleton may be proud.

But at some point in his long service, Jim Angleton's sharp and studious mind became confused by Jim Angleton's ideology. As the external world changed, as it became clear that Khrushchev's policies would not be those of Stalin, that the United States had won the cold war, that rumors of a Sino-Soviet split were true, Angleton found it difficult to straighten out in his own mind the agency's confused purpose.

Ideology told him the cold war must go on, that the Chinese and Russians were faking their feud, that the comings and goings of Aeroflot representatives to new nations revealed a Soviet intent on aggression in those nations, that those who had sold Mr. Nixon on detente were dupes and possibly knaves. He believed his ideology and shaped facts to fit it and his power became dangerous.

He is not the last of the ideologists to leave the agency but his departure will help CIA to straighten out its purpose: It is, after all a service, not a weapon in the cold war.

A New CIA Furor

Born of the cold war, shielded by unprecedented governmental secrecy and infused with a romantic cloak-and-dagger glamour, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been able to resist close scrutiny and withstand harsh criticism throughout most of its 27-year history. But recent disclosures of the agency's involvement in Watergate and its role in the fall of an elected Marxist government in Chile have left the CIA unusually vulnerable. And when The New York Times broke a story last week alleging that the agency had conducted massive, illegal surveillance of American citizens, the result was electric. Within days, the CIA's top counterintelligence officer announced his resignation and former CIA director Richard Helms seemed likely to lose his current post as ambassador to Iran. Capitol Hill rang with calls for greater Congressional control of the agency, and President Gerald Ford took time out from his holiday ski trip to consider a blue-ribbon investigation of the whole mysterious affair.

The story that touched off the flap was surprisingly tough in the headline (**HUGE CIA OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR FORCES . . .**) but sparse in detail. Reporter Seymour M. Hersh, who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1970 for uncovering the My Lai massacre, cited "well-placed government sources" in reporting that the CIA, "directly violating its charter," had conducted massive, coordinated intelligence operations in the U.S. during the Nixon Administration—following and photographing antiwar activists and other dissidents (including at least one member of Congress), undertaking illegal break-ins and wiretaps and compiling dossiers on more than 10,000 American citizens under the control of a special unit that Hersh said reported directly to CIA chief Helms. "It was highly coordinated," one Times source was quoted as saying. "People were targeted, information was collected on them, and it was all put on [computer] tape, just like the agency does with information about KGB [Soviet intelligence] agents."

Conspiracy? The reaction was immediate. The chairmen of four Congressional committees announced inquiries into the affair, and President Ford declared that he would not tolerate illegal domestic actions by the CIA. Ford said the current director, William E. Colby, had assured him that no such operations were now under way, but he ordered Colby to prepare a complete report on the matter—and he had it within days.

Still, confirmation of the charges was at best partial and cautious, and there was no confirmation of the Times's clear implication that the CIA's operation had been prompted by the Nixon Administration to harass the left. The resulting confusion nurtured conspiracy theories in Washington: that the whole flap had been used to blast the CIA's top counter-spy out of his job, for example, or that it was an eruption of the intricate rivalry between Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, a former CIA head, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the White House na-

tional-security adviser and head of the top-secret Forty Committee, which approves all covert operations.

The only flat denial of Hersh's charges came from Helms, and even then it took him three days to issue a statement through the State Department before dropping out of sight on what officials said was a long-planned European vacation. But there was fragmentary confirmation of a sort from James J. Angleton, a top-level CIA veteran who resigned as chief of counterintelligence after the Times story described him as the director of the alleged domestic spy operation (opposite page). Angleton called the Times story an exaggeration, but he conceded there was "something to it." In an extended interview with CBS-TV correspondent Daniel Schorr, he admitted keeping files on "Americans like Black Panthers and antiwar demonstrators, but only after they'd contacted agents abroad." Such action, ostensibly, was in line with the agency's lawful foreign-intelligence responsibilities.

'Overstepping': Reactions from other well-placed sources ranged from guarded confirmation to outright skepticism. A source familiar with Colby's 30-page report to Ford told NEWSWEEK: "There's something to Hersh's charges, but a hell of a lot less than he makes of it." Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee, said he had been briefed last year about "overstepping of bounds" by the CIA. "You might call it illegalities in terms of exceeding their charter," he said, "but it certainly wasn't of the dimension . . . of what has appeared in the newspapers." The FBI tended to scoff at the whole notion of a massive domestic operation by the CIA; had it happened, said one longtime agent, "we would have come across it. Our guys were out there doing the same thing." If dossiers were kept, other sources said, they could have been compiled from intelligence that is routinely supplied to the CIA by the FBI or local police departments with which the agency maintains close—if questionable—ties.

Just what *had* gone on? To begin with, the CIA has a long history of domestic activity, much of it perfectly legal. Despite restrictions in the 1947 National Security Act (in which the agency was barred from domestic "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions"), the agency recruits staffers inside the U.S., investigates their backgrounds and associates, sets up sophisticated "front" organizations for use in foreign operations and takes steps to protect all its plans, personnel and projects from enemy penetration. "This gave rise to the most enormous counterspy activities you've ever imagined," one source told NEWSWEEK—and he cited the agency's security division and James Angleton's counterintelligence section as centers of widespread domestic activity.

The legal operations, however, occasionally "spilled over" to illegal operations—and CIA sources privately admit that the agency has been exceeding its authority on a more-or-less-regular basis at least since the Kennedy era. To be legal, most domestic surveillance work triggered by CIA operations overseas should be farmed out to the FBI. But former top officials of both the CIA and the FBI concede privately that the initial "close working relationship" between the two agencies often resulted in the CIA handling its own affairs. "We'd ask the bureau to do something and maybe they didn't have the strength in that area or they were short of manpower, and they'd tell us to take care of the matter ourselves," said the CIA veteran. "So we would."

As far back as the 1950s, these sources agreed, the agency was involved in domestic surveillance and wiretapping prohibited by its 1947 charter. These cases were generally a direct result of CIA foreign investigations, they said, but even Americans with only second- or third-hand contact with a "foreign agency" might well come under scrutiny.

Obsessed: In 1970, the Nixon Administration stepped up demands for CIA activity inside the U.S. As the Watergate hearings revealed, the President and his closest advisers were nearly obsessed by fears that foreign elements were firing up domestic radicals. And a top-level FBI official says H.R. Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff, "was no longer satisfied with what we [the bureau] were giving him." Some sources maintained last week that Helms was reluctant to follow the White House orders and that his response was mostly pro forma, but others described the former CIA chief as an artful bureaucrat who generally did as the President desired. White House aide Tom Charles Huston reported to his boss at the time that Helms was "most cooperative and helpful" in meetings called to set up the short-lived "Huston plan" for all-out domestic surveillance by various agencies of the government.

In any event, the CIA was foremost among the agencies that submitted reports on domestic radicals to the Nixon-created Intelligence Evaluation Board. And a responsible official familiar with the evaluation board's activities told NEWSWEEK that the CIA contributions "showed a good working knowledge of the radical left and in my opinion must have resulted from some field work in this country." One CIA source acknowledged that the agency had conducted investigations of campus disorders in the late '60s and early '70s, particularly in cases where CIA recruiting stations or research projects were involved—such as a 1968 bombing in Ann Arbor, Mich. In addition, the agency reportedly was prevailed upon to undertake domestic "field work" on the international problems of narcotics traffic and airline hijacking by terrorist groups.

But it was unclear whether Helms or anyone else at the agency actually went on to set up the secret unit mentioned in the Times story. And thus it remained to be seen whether the irregularities involved were even more serious than those already privately conceded by officials. Meanwhile, Washington was trying to figure out just how last week's revela-

NEWSWEEK

6 January 1975

ANGLETON: THE QUIET AMERICAN

tions figured in the internal politics of "the invisible government"—as the U.S. intelligence establishment came to be known. Among the logical sources of the story were some of the 1,800 CIA staffers cashiered by former director Schlesinger in his 1973 attempt to streamline the agency (an effort so unpopular, reportedly, that his squad of personal bodyguards had to be increased). Some insiders also suspected a contribution by a Schlesinger staffer and onetime CIA division chief who is thought to harbor a personal grudge against Angleton.

Boiling: Angleton, in turn, has told friends he was done in by Secretary of State Kissinger in retaliation for his outspoken doubts about the U.S. policy of détente with Russia and China. Kissinger, one insider said, was not above exploiting an opportunity to embarrass Colby, who on several occasions has appeared to blame the Secretary for ordering the CIA's controversial assistance to the now-deposed Greek junta and the Chilean "destabilization" plan. "Henry's been boiling for a chance to get Colby, and this was it," said one CIA nuance-reader. "He loves to see Colby squirm."

But far more serious was the state of public confidence in the CIA and the Congressional controls under which it is supposed to operate. Even supporters of the agency agreed that a full-scale investigation would be necessary to clear the air. "A public Congressional investigation could dig out the rot if there is rot—or stop the rumors if there is not," said former CIA executive director Lyman Kirkpatrick. And such proposals were quickly picked up on Capitol Hill, where traditional awe for the agency has largely faded.

Just three years ago, Mississippi's Sen. John Stennis could stoutly defend the old see-no-evil approach. "You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some and take what is coming," Stennis said then. But Congress recently passed an amendment to the foreign-aid bill that puts strict limits on the expenditure of funds for CIA operations abroad, and 33 senators have now agreed to co-sponsor another bill establishing a new fourteen-member joint committee with sweeping powers to investigate all U.S. intelligence agencies. "The documented litany of snoop shops spying domestically, and the reluctance of these agencies to be accountable to Congress, tears at the very fabric of our constitutional democracy," said Connecticut's Lowell Weicker, one of the bill's originators.

President Ford, *Newsweek* learned, was preparing a "blue-ribbon" investigation of his own, although whether it would be handled by one man or a special team was not immediately clear. "What is certain," said one former CIA man, "is that the Times story has again set in motion forces critical of the agency, and Ford is going to have a hard time just kissing it off with a superficial peek." It was just as clear that Ford and the Congress had a real chance to rein in the invisible government—and that the CIA was less able than ever to resist,

ning orchids. Thus when the war ended and the stars of such classmates as Kingman Brewster and William Kunstler ascended, Angleton stayed out in the cold. As one member of the class of '41 put it, "Jim sort of went into the woodwork 30 years ago and hadn't been seen since then—until he surfaced the other day."

In 1954, Angleton—known to some in the trade as "Fisherman"—began his two decades as head of the powerful and mysterious unit whose task is to ensure that foreign intelligence agents do not infiltrate the CIA. Its chief, one source said, meets the greatest "personal demands any human can face. He is a secret policeman within a secret organization. He must constantly deal with the reality that his friends, his colleagues, his leaders or indeed his own family could be 'penetrated'." (Ironically, one of his friends was Kim Philby, the British agent who defected to Russia in 1963.) The stress took its toll on Angleton, jeopardizing his marriage, cutting him off from his three children and endangering his life. "He had emphysema," said an ex-FBI agent, "and he'd had half his stomach removed. It was his pace. He literally worked himself to pieces."

Angleton's reaction to last week's disclosures betrayed the strain, careening from belligerent denial to partial agreement. When New York Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh published his story, Angleton called the reporter a money-grubbing "son of a bitch"—but then added that the Times account had "something to it" and that "there should be a full investigation." When another reporter in a late-night telephone interview asked why he had resigned, Angleton seemed still more disjointed: "Police state... Soviet bloc... fragmentation... I had a son in the infantry in Vietnam. Went from private to corporal." Was the boy wounded or killed? "No," Angleton replied slowly, "I think he's OK."

That odd speech was only an exaggeration of Angleton's usual convoluted; by one account, two previous CIA directors had considered sacking him. But in the end, it was Angleton's total distrust of Communism and détente that became burdensome to the CIA. "He was not a man for all times," said an ex-agent. "He was a man for one time. He was a man for the cold war."

Rattling Skeletons in the CIA Closet

It's been tough going for the Central Intelligence Agency of late. The agency was tarnished by Watergate and embarrassed by revelations that it had spent \$8 million to undermine Chilean President Salvador Allende's Marxist government. Last week threatened to bring even worse opprobrium. On Capitol Hill, the heads of four different committees and subcommittees announced parallel investigations of the CIA to begin when Congress reconvenes. From his vacation retreat in Vail, Colo., Gerald Ford ordered up a report by CIA Director William E. Colby that was flown to him by courier plane. The cause of the furor was a story in the *New York Times* charging that for about 20 years the CIA had illegally spied on many American citizens within the U.S.

One immediate consequence was the departure of a little-known but important official, James Angleton, who had served as CIA chief of counter-intelligence. Angleton, it was believed, supervised the domestic espionage operations. But he denied having anything to do with domestic surveillance and insisted that his resignation was solely because of an indiscretion in the course of an interview with the *Times* that could have jeopardized a U.S. agent in Moscow.

The main outline of the domestic spying was drawn by *Times* Reporter Seymour M. Hersh (see THE PRESS). He wrote that the agency had conducted in the U.S. clandestine surveillance operations—including wiretaps, break-ins (known as "bag jobs") and surreptitious interception of mail—and eventually amassed intelligence files on some 10,000 Americans. Hersh disclosed no names, though he mentioned that at least one Congressman had been involved.

Among the targets of CIA surveillance, TIME has learned, were Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, former Democratic Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher of New Jersey, Democratic Representative Claude Pepper of Florida and the late Democratic Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri. A high CIA official, responding to a TIME inquiry, denied that the agency had kept any kind of watch on these public men. But other sources insisted that the surveillance had been conducted.

Such activity would clearly violate the National Security Act of 1947, which states that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions." The law limits the agency's espionage functions to foreign operations. When the CIA follows a target to the U.S. or uncovers a connection between a foreign operative and a domestic group, the case is supposed to be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

For the moment at least, the agency was hunkering down. Former Director Richard Helms, under whose stewardship the most recent abuses ostensibly occurred, is now

ambassador to Iran. Before he left Tehran last week for a vacation trip through Europe to the U.S., he "categorically denied" in a cable to the State Department that the illicit operations had taken place. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who was Helms' immediate successor, remained silent.

Other members of the intelligence community, however, maintained that the report was exaggerated. One intelligence officer said that the report "suggests, most unfairly, that these violations were systematic and massive rather than aberrations." Some experts theorized that the Hersh figure represents not surveillance in the sinister sense but the number of Americans whose names have been fed into CIA computers under a name-check system. Being included was not necessarily invidious. According to Victor Marchetti, a disillusioned former agency official and co-author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, "Into that system go the names of anyone who visited an 'enemy' or politically sensitive country whom the agency might have wanted to debrief. There are also lists from travel companies and airlines and others shared with the agency by Army intelligence or the FBI." Using Actress Jane Fonda as a hypothetical but plausible example—she opposed the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam and visited Hanoi—Marchetti speculates that the CIA computer would probably store the names of all her known business, professional and personal associates.

Gray Area. The agency's defenders emphasize the distinction between 10,000 names in a computer memory bank and 10,000 dossiers. They also insisted that whatever domestic spying took place was relatively isolated and resulted from links—real or imagined—between Americans and foreign subversive organizations. The defenders suggested that there is a "gray area" in which foreign and domestic operations cannot be neatly separated. According to insiders, these borderline transgressions tended to follow four patterns:

1) A foreign agent takes up residence in the U.S., perhaps under embassy cover, and contacts U.S. citizens. As a consequence, the agency decides to keep tab on those citizens.

2) An American political dissenter goes abroad and travels to Communist or other unfriendly countries. The agency decides to run computer checks on his associates in the U.S.

3) A CIA agent who has been posted abroad returns to Washington and decides to follow up on a domestic angle of his work overseas.

4) An employee like Marchetti leaves the CIA and begins exposing its activities, prompting the agency to investigate the ex-employee and his associates in the U.S.

Handing these cases over to the FBI became increasingly difficult as relations between the two agencies deteriorated in the 1950s and '60s. On "hundreds of occasions," one source recalled, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover arbitrarily turned down CIA requests for surveillances, wiretaps and bugs. "Screw the CIA—let them do their own work!" Hoover reportedly exclaimed at one point. As a result, the CIA increasingly by-

passed the FBI, though it always carefully established a foreign connection to justify each domestic operation and give it a quasi-legitimate appearance. Another justification was the law's rather vague provision making the CIA director "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

None of these reasons seemed to explain the CIA's interest in Justice Douglas and the three members of Congress. Douglas came under scrutiny in the mid-'60s after he visited the Dominican Republic. As for Representative Gallagher (who recently served 17 months of a two-year prison sentence for income-tax evasion that had no connection with national security), the CIA apparently sought information about his contacts with officials in the Dominican Republic. In the case of Senator Long, it was his negotiations with foreign companies, and in the case of Representative Pepper, his relations with Cuban refugees living in his district that apparently interested the CIA.

When told of the CIA's attention to him, Pepper said, "I do declare, I didn't know anything about it. I'm utterly at a loss." Douglas said last week that he was unaware of any CIA concern with him.

Whatever these excesses of the '50s and '60s, there is a strong suspicion that the CIA's domestic spying increased as the Nixon Administration became preoccupied with combatting left-wing protesters. In 1970 Nixon briefly endorsed the program drawn up by his aide, Tom Charles Huston, for break-ins, electronic eavesdropping and other forms of snooping to keep tab on Viet Nam War opponents and other radicals. The CIA's Angleton was a member of the *ad hoc* committee that discussed the plan. When Hoover refused to cooperate, it was supposed that the scheme had been abandoned altogether. But presidential aides—with or without Nixon's consent—are thought to have persuaded the CIA, or at least some members of the agency, to go ahead with it.

That cooperation with the White House may well explain why the CIA willingly gave CIA Alumnus E. Howard Hunt bogus identification papers, a wig and other equipment for the White House "plumbers." According to Seymour Glanzer, a member of the Justice Department's original Watergate team, the CIA blocked the prosecutors' efforts "to get at the truth" before the first Watergate trial in 1973. He added: "The CIA officials were well aware of the situation. They knew the full story. But the CIA was of no assistance. They gave us nothing. They frustrated and thwarted our efforts to get at the truth."

Calls for Review. Many observers in Washington who are far from naive about the CIA nevertheless consider its past chiefs and most of its officials highly educated, sensitive and dedicated public servants who would scarcely let themselves get involved in the kind of massive scheme described. But that is not to say that abuses did not occur. A few days before the Hersh story appeared, Colby had an off-the-record session with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Some of those present were apparently aware of Hersh's

TIME, JANUARY 6, 1975

The Spy Who Came into the Heat

Egging and questioned Colby about the domestic activities of the CIA. One participant recalls: "The implication was that Colby [when he assumed the directorship in 1973] discovered more than he thought had been going on and that he put a stop to it."

The charges against the CIA do not involve totally new violations of civil liberties by the Government. To an extent, the new controversy is a jurisdictional question. But the basic issue is whether public officials are obeying the law.

Similar acts have been committed by the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and Army intelligence. There is one important difference, however. Unlike the CIA, the other agencies are subject to review by the courts or other restraints. Precisely because the CIA was not made subject to vigorous, systematic review, its founders in Congress prohibited it from operations within the U.S. borders. However the present charges against the CIA are sorted out, almost inevitably there will be—and should be—new calls for closer supervision of the agency.

Until recent weeks, James Angleton was a paradigm of his arcane trade. Cultivated in taste, shrewd in intellect, and above all discreet in his work for the CIA, Angleton, 57, was in the twilight of a distinguished career.

Then, suddenly, he became a casualty of the constant tension that a covert agency must live with in an open society. As the *New York Times* was about to blow his cover, Angleton blew his cool. In a telephone conversation with Seymour Hersh, he let slip that the CIA had a "source" in Moscow who was "still active and still productive."

Last week, his career ended, Angleton's gaunt, 6-ft. figure was more stooped than usual. His speech slurred by exhaustion, he insisted that his actions had been intended solely to protect the U.S. from its archenemy, the Soviet Union. Said he: "I have seen no change in the Soviets at any time, where the Soviets have ever deviated from their own desire to take over."

Meanwhile, bits of information about his background surfaced. His late father, James Hugh Angleton, was a businessman with foreign connections. During World War II, the elder Angleton became a lieutenant colonel in the OSS. The son went to Yale (class of '41). Fellow Student William Bundy, an ex-CIA man and now editor of *Foreign Affairs*, recalls Angleton as "a person of great depth in whom one sensed a con-

stant searching." Among other things, Angleton worked on the campus magazine, the *Lit*.

After Yale, Angleton spent two years at Harvard Law School, then followed his father into the OSS. Immediately after the war, he worked for a U.S. intelligence operation in Italy that helped pro-American politicians win election over leftist opponents. He joined the CIA when it was formed in 1947 and served for a while overseas.

Kim Philby, the British spy who defected to Moscow, mentioned Angleton in his book *My Silent War*. Philby found Angleton hard-driving and liked his American colleague. They frequently dined together, and Philby described him as "one of the thinnest men I have ever met and one of the biggest eaters."

In 1954 Angleton assumed responsibility for counter-espionage—combating the activities of adversary spooks round the world. Victor Marchetti, the ex-CIA official who turned agency critic, said that colleagues regarded Angleton as "a gentleman, a connoisseur of fine wines, an intellectual who knew orchids, and a fanatic who was always able to keep his fanaticism in rein."

His indiscretion in dealing with Hersh astonished Angleton's friends. Mourned one: "It was wildly out of character. I can only think that Jim cracked under the strain of knowing that the *Times* story was coming and there was nothing he could do about it."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 January 1975

CIA faces challenge in House

Harrington files federal suit, lays plans to curb agency's freedom of action

By Stewart Dill McBride

Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

One of the Congress's most active critics of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched a renewed drive at curbing the agency's powers.

As part of his efforts to keep public attention focused on the widely criticized CIA, Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D) of Massachusetts has filed a suit in the U.S. District Court in Washington seeking an injunction against CIA foreign operations and domestic spying, on grounds they are illegal.

In addition he plans to:

- Block an ambassadorial confirmation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a State Department official who allegedly tried to conceal the CIA's efforts to undermine the regime of Chile's late President Salvador Allende Gossens.

- Pressure the House Democratic Caucus to support the establishment of a select congressional committee to investigate the agency's anti-Allende

activities. Mr. Harrington is sending out a "Dear Colleague" letter to the entire caucus in hopes of drumming up support among his 291 Democratic colleagues in the 94th Congress.

- Initiate a renewed inquiry by the House Foreign Affairs Committee — of which he is a member — and House Armed Service Committee into alleged illegal intelligence operations at home and abroad.

The suit, filed in U.S. District Court in Washington last week, contends that the 1947 National Security Act establishing the CIA restricts its foreign activities to those "related to intelligence" and does not authorize foreign interventions such as the anti-Allende campaign in Chile.

In September, Rep. Harrington leaked secret testimony by CIA director William E. Colby before a House subcommittee that the CIA was authorized by the Nixon administration to spend more than \$8 million secretly from 1970 to 1973 to undermine the regime of the late President Allende. The Allende government was overthrown in a military coup on Sept. 11 in which the Chilean President died.

Mr. Harrington's suit asks the court to declare illegal and halt all CIA domestic spying operations and foreign activities which extend beyond the realm of information gathering.

Mr. Harrington says that recent reports by the *New York Times* that the CIA maintained files on some 10,000 U.S. citizens during the Nixon Administration have strengthened his case, which has been in preparation since October.

He says he is not satisfied with President Ford's request that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conduct an inquiry on grounds that as a member of the National Security Council and head of the "40 Committee" which approved CIA operations in Chile, "Kissinger has been responsible for directing CIA activities."

Better supervision sought

Ultimately he hopes to turn all intelligence oversight responsibilities from the various congressional subcommittees — which he claims are understaffed and meet rarely — to a special joint congressional committee which would "analyze the total reorganization of the entire intelligence community" — a plan Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D) of Minnesota also has proposed.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 6, 1975

A CIA SCANDAL—AND THE BACKLASH

Were Americans illegally spied on at home by U. S. intelligence agents? It's an issue creating a furor—plus calls for Congress to take action.

The latest crisis to hit the Central Intelligence Agency is focusing attention on this question:

Can the nation's top-secret espionage service survive much longer in its present form?

From all sides, demands are being made for an exhaustive investigation into the organization's activities, especially those carried on inside the U. S.

At the same time, fresh momentum is building up to bring the CIA under much stricter congressional control.

Some officials fear that the effectiveness of the Agency could be undermined, perhaps even destroyed, by the continuing exposure and supervision that are being urged.

Behind the most recent demands to investigate—and possibly overhaul—the CIA are allegations that the organization engaged in massive, illegal domestic espionage against Americans before and during the Nixon Administration.

Newspaper charges. "The New York Times," which first published the allegations, claims that these intelligence operations were directed against American participants in the antiwar and other protest movements.

The newspaper charged that a special unit of the CIA maintained intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens, authorized its agents to shadow and photograph participants in protest demonstrations and planted its informants inside dissident groups.

Other illegal domestic operations by the CIA were alleged to have taken place during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. These involved break-ins, wiretapping and surveillance of mail during investigations of foreign espionage activities in this country.

James R. Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense, reportedly uncovered evidence of these counterespionage activities during his brief period as CIA Director in 1973. He is said to have issued an order halting all questionable counterintelligence operations carried on by the Agency inside the U. S.

The Act establishing the CIA in 1947 forbids the Agency from exercising "police, subpoena, law-enforcement power or internal-security functions."

The charge that the CIA had spied on U. S. citizens had these wide-ranging repercussions in late December:

- President Ford demanded an immediate report from CIA Director William E. Colby, who thereupon assured the Chief Executive that "nothing comparable" to the alleged activities of the past is going on now. Mr. Colby's report, prepared within 48 hours, was delivered to the President at the Vail, Colo., ski resort.

- Four congressional committees in-

dicated their intentions to hold hearings early in the new year on the latest charges leveled against the Agency.

- Former CIA Director John A. McCone called for a "penetrating investigation" of the charges—by Congress or by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

- Former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford urged an investigation by a special joint congressional committee rather than by House and Senate panels that normally deal with the CIA. Mr. Clifford helped draft the CIA charter and served on presidential foreign-intelligence advisory boards through much of the 1960s.

- A flat denial of "The New York Times" charges came from Richard M. Helms, CIA Director from 1966 to 1973 when the domestic espionage activities allegedly occurred. Mr. Helms, now U. S. Ambassador to Iran, issued this statement through the State Department: "Ambassador Helms has categorically denied that under his stewardship the CIA conducted illegal domestic operations against antiwar activists or dissidents or that any unit to do so was created under him as Director."

- The chief of the CIA's supersecret counterintelligence unit, James Angleton, resigned at the request of "higher authorities." At first, he told a reporter that while "The New York Times" charges were exaggerated, there was "something to it." Later he repudiated that statement, declaring: "As far as I am concerned, I had no knowledge of any such activities by the Agency, but I can't speak for the Agency."

- A Congressman who is one of those supposed to act as "watchdog" over CIA activities revealed that his committee had been informed of "an overstepping of bounds" which "you might call illegalities in terms of exceeding their charter." Representative Lucien N. Nedzi (Dem.), of Michigan, who is chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, stated that these "improprieties" were not of "the dimension of what has appeared in the newspapers."

This pattern of confusing and contradictory statements makes it clear that any attempt to establish the facts of what actually has been going on in the murky world where spies and counter-spies operate is bound to be a daunting task for congressional investigators.

One reason: There is an apparent conflict in the legal responsibilities of the Director of the CIA in carrying out his duties. On one hand, the law forbids him from exercising "internal-security functions." But on the other, the law makes him "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Sources close to the CIA suggest that this contradiction may account for some of "The New York Times" allegations concerning illegal domestic spying. They point out that Mr. Angleton, as chief of the CIA's counterintelligence unit, had the task of guarding the Agency from penetration by foreign

spies, protecting its sources of information and preventing intelligence secrets from falling into enemy hands. This included investigation of potential "double agents" inside the Agency.

That role made him, as described by associates, "one of the most powerful and certainly the most feared" officials in the CIA prior to his resignation on December 23.

Government officials say that in the area where Mr. Angleton operated it is sometimes difficult to draw a sharp line between foreign-intelligence and domestic counterintelligence actions—authorized by the law—and domestic counterespionage—which is illegal when practiced by the CIA.

Another factor that observers say will complicate a congressional investigation of the Agency's activities inside the U. S. is the bitter feud that raged for some years between the CIA and the FBI. At one point in 1970, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover reportedly ordered his staff to cease co-operation with the Intelligence Agency.

Informed sources say that this break in relations forced the CIA to take on counterespionage tasks inside the country to protect the Agency against infiltration by agents of foreign governments living in America. Qualified observers assert that the breakdown in CIA-FBI co-operation may have led to the domestic counterespionage operations cited in the allegations published by "The New York Times."

One further factor adding to the confusion: The White House was reported to have ordered the Agency in 1969 to determine the extent, if any, of foreign involvement in the antiwar movement and in the black revolutionary groups in this country. Officials suggest that this investigation may have had domestic ramifications since so many Americans were involved in dissidence at that time.

Whatever emerges in congressional hearings or from a special "Watergate type" inquiry—if one is organized—there is no doubt that the CIA's continuing troubles are the most serious that the Agency has had in its 27-year history.

The allegations of illegal domestic spying surfaced while the Central Intelligence Agency was still reeling from three earlier shocks:

- The disclosure of illegal CIA involvement in the Watergate affair.

- Publication of a book by a former member of the Agency who unveiled embarrassing CIA secrets concerning clandestine activities around the world.

- Revelation of covert operations by the Agency against President Salvador Allende's Marxist regime in Chile.

Boon for critics. These developments provided ammunition to those critics of the Central Intelligence Agency who have been waging a persistent campaign to overhaul the Agency and bring it under tight congressional control. The campaign has achieved significant gains in recent months. Thus—

1. The Senate Armed Services Com-



CIA'S ROLE INSIDE U.S.— WHAT THE LAW SAYS, HOW IT'S CARRIED OUT

From the 1947 law that created the Central Intelligence Agency:

"The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions."

From an interview with CIA Director William E. Colby that appeared in the Dec. 2, 1974, issue of "U.S. News & World Report":

Q "Do you operate at all inside the United States?"

A "We have no internal-security functions or police or law-enforcement powers. It is clear that our function is only foreign intelligence."

"What do we do inside the United States?"

"We have a large building up on the Potomac River with a lot of employees. In order to know something about them before we hire them, we conduct security investigations. We also make contracts with people around the country to supply us with things that we can use in our activities abroad. And we

have contracts for research projects so that we can expand the base of our knowledge."

"We have a service in our agency that talks to Americans who may have knowledge of some foreign situation that they are willing to share with their Government. We identify ourselves as representatives of the CIA, and we assure these Americans that they will be protected as a source—and we will do so. But we don't pay them and we don't conduct clandestine operations to obtain such intelligence."

"We have some support structures in this country for our work abroad. We also collect foreign intelligence from foreigners in America. This is intelligence about foreign countries and has nothing to do with protecting the internal security of this country against those foreigners. That is the job of the FBI, with which we have a clear understanding and good cooperation as to our respective functions."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JANUARY 1975

Of the C.I.A. and Its Supervision by Congress


To the Editor:

The recent revelations in The Times about the C.I.A. violating its charter and "spying" on 10,000 Americans is undoubtedly going to stimulate calls for intensive Congressional investigations. I believe this entire area of C.I.A. and F.B.I. involvement should be aired and aired well, forthrightly and carefully as the Watergate investigation was so that we can end this chapter in our lives quickly, close the books and get on with the job of rebuilding our nation.

I suggest that instead of several Congressional committees that Congress create one committee—a joint committee to oversee both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. A previous effort to create a joint committee on the C.I.A. was introduced by Senator Mansfield in 1956, but the resolution was defeated in the same year. [Editorial Jan. 26, 1956.]

If the C.I.A. violated its Congressional mandate to stay out of domestic matters, it is the fault of Congress. Almost thirty years ago in 1947 when the National Security Act creating the agency was written, members then knew as some members now know that in creating such an agency as this, responsible to the President and without Congressional supervision, power would flow to it.

Many of the members of Congress who were active in 1947 are now either retired or deceased. Many new members are not familiar with the Act, the law or the debates. Therefore, the bureaucrats, however well-intentioned they may be, begin to believe their own publicity. With a Government agency created by Congress, Congress must review it. Congress created the C.I.A. and the



supervise both. Congress does not properly supervise either one.

Every nation needs an intelligence agency and its internal security agency. But here, where we place such a high value on our personal liberties, we created two agencies to divide the power and the responsibility. And we did it for a good reason. It's high time that we stopped appointing "Hoover" Commissions as we did in 1955 to look at the C.I.A. It is Congress' responsibility to take a hard look at both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., especially after Watergate, not necessarily to find fault with either, but to restore trust in them by the American people whom they are supposed to serve.

LAURENCE W. LEVINE
New York, Dec. 24, 1974

To the Editor:

Your Dec. 24 editorial "Unguarded Intelligence" refers to "unwise but not illegal covert activities abroad" of the Central Intelligence Agency. Indisputably Congress prohibited spying in the United States by the C.I.A. My research causes me to doubt even the legality of covert political operations

late principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and in most cases the laws of sovereign nations where covert political manipulation is attempted.

I would point out that nowhere in the 1947 Congressional statute creating the C.I.A. or in later amendments can explicit authority be found for overseas covert political operations. All functions assigned to the C.I.A., even in the more flexible phrases of the statute, were explicitly to be related to intelligence.

Intelligence means information. Yet almost everyone, including the President, seems to be confused about the meaning of this word, intelligence.

Consequently, the intelligence world has become an Alice-in-Wonderland fantasy where words can mean whatever you want them to mean. We need to return to a world where words mean what they are supposed to mean. And we need to bring some intelligence to the Intelligence Establishment.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 26, 1974

The writer, professor of political science, Vanderbilt University, wrote "The Intelligence Establishment."

WASHINGTON STAR
31 December 1974

MARY McGORY

Let James Neal Take On CIA

By Mary McGory

Star-News Staff Writer

Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., one of the few members of Congress who seems exercised about the matter, has called for a special prosecutor to investigate charges of CIA lawlessness at home.

If he is serious, an excellent candidate is at hand. He is James F. Neal, who has served with distinction as the chief prosecutor in the Watergate conspiracy trial. Neal is anxious to return to his law practice in Tennessee, but if he could be prevailed upon to render yet another service to the Republic, he would be the ideal man for the job.

Neal's high professionalism has been admired by opposing counsel in the long and tedious uncovering of the cover-up. He is tough, but never snide. He knows the terrain, and he knows the habits of the high-level outlaw who invokes "national security" when cornered.

He is a connoisseur of the rituals now being enacted in McLean as they once were at the White House — the hollow denial, the dumping of a few bodies to suggest reform, the assurances that "everybody does it," coupled with promises that it will never happen again, although there was nothing really wrong about it.

THE CHANCES for the naming of a special prosecutor, especially one of Neal's caliber, are dim. And the outlook for an investigation worthy of the name on Capitol Hill is slim. Four committees are clamoring for the honor, but the attitude toward the CIA was best expressed in an early Watergate crisis by Maurice Stans, the former finance chairman of the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Confronted with the awful fact that Gordon Liddy had received \$200,000 of campaign funds to do God knows what, Stans said: "You

WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1975

Firing of Angleton Was Urged Early

CIA Aide's Hard Line Hit

Almost from the day he was appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William E. Colby was urged to fire James J. Angleton as head of the agency's counterintelligence division.

Angleton, the fiercely opinionated countercyber who has directed counterintelligence in CIA for a quarter of a century, is the central figure in the controversy over domestic spying activities by the agency, which is, by statute, to confine itself to foreign intelligence-gathering.

One of those who contacted Colby, a former high-level clandestine officer, said in an interview that

under the aegis of Angleton there "were certainly reprehensible if not quite illegal unquote things done."

Another long-standing veteran of the agency, who has held one of the most prestigious jobs in the CIA's intelligence directorate, said that the leadership of the counterintelligence department reflected a "paranoid mentality" on international affairs.

"Anybody who in recent years held the view that the conflicts between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as well as the Soviet Union and China are deceptions to dupe the Western world . . . are simply not in touch with reality," said the former official.

He disclosed that several internal studies were conducted within CIA in 1970-1971 to determine whether the antiwar movement had any sponsorship from foreign governments. The CIA studies concluded, he said, that there was no foreign support of the movement.

Yet, he added, "if an intellectual or journalist had contacts with, say, an Eastern bloc diplomat, the premises of the counterintelligence people were that it could be for no other purpose but espionage."

Much of the objection to Angleton's continued tenure at CIA centered on this hard-line view of international relations and its impact on his conduct of the counterintelligence role. Even some of his detractors, however, paid trib-

ging. And what occurred, after all, took place under his supervision. He is, additionally, the Gallup poll tells us, the most admired man in America, which would further unnerve the faint-hearts on the Hill.

If the President is stirred to further action and appoints a blue-ribbon panel to delve, the chances are that it will be composed of establishment types like John McCone, former CIA director, and possibly the brothers Bundy, whose protectiveness towards the establishment is well-established.

What is needed, Harrington points out, is a restructuring of the agency and an in-depth study of the mentality of McLean. Such glimpses as we have had of that mind-set were seen through a glass darkly in the ever-changing testimony of E. Howard Hunt, the Watergate burglar who served the "company" for 20 years.

The hope of documentation is not bright. The CIA shredder is the fastest in town, exceeding even the destructive capacity of CRPs.

The real trouble is that too many men on Capitol Hill, who will be quick to note the minimum partisan gain from a serious probe — four administrations were involved, Nedzi suggested — are thrilled by the swish of the cloak and blinded by the flash of the dagger.

They also bridle at the thought that the ordinary taxpayer should be privy to the closely held secret of how much money the CIA gets and to what dark uses it is put at home and abroad.

The publication of the names of the 10,000 might create a lobby for the truth about the subject and cause Congress to do something. But those who remember that it took the October firestorm to produce any action on Watergate are not making any bets that Congress—or the CIA—will change its ways.

ute to Angleton's effectiveness in thwarting espionage penetration of the CIA.

As the counterintelligence chief spent the final work day of his 31-year career in the U.S. intelligence service, there was growing evidence that the agency indulged in highly questionable—if not illegal—surveillance of American citizens.

One former CIA operative, who recently left the intelligence service, corroborated accounts of burglaries directed against foreign embassies. Qualified officials, familiar with Colby's report to President Ford, also acknowledged that some prominent American citizens were also the targets of CIA surveillance in operations which strayed far from the commonly accepted objectives of the 1947 National

Security Act under which CIA was created.

So well concealed were the CIA surveillance activities within the United States that one high-ranking former FBI official acknowledged that the bureau had no inkling of any such activities within its investigative jurisdiction.

Both CIA and FBI officials reaffirmed yesterday that the operational code under which the two agencies functioned proscribed the CIA from conducting counterintelligence functions within the United States.

"If Hoover [the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover] had an inkling that anything like this was going on," the FBI veteran said, "he would have blown a gasket and put a stop to it."

The CIA's 1947 charter provides that the agency shall have "no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

However, other provisions of the same charter require the CIA director to be "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The charter further states that the agency should "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Agency may from time to time direct."

One official who has been kept closely briefed on the progress of the domestic spying investigation said yesterday that "there wasn't much that happened which did not have the prior authorization of the National Security Council."

An acknowledgement that the CIA was responsible for a number of burglaries within the United States was made by a former intelligence officer in an interview with The Washington Post.

The ex-CIA officer said he had no knowledge of break-ins against domestic political groups, and said he doubted that any have occurred, but he did corroborate the allegation that the CIA engineered a burglary at the Chilean embassy here in 1972, an earlier break-in at the Israeli embassy and other foreign installations, particularly in New York, where foreign governments have U.N. embassies.

The CIA, he said, was principally interested in photographing codebooks from the foreign embassies which would be useful in reading past messages, even if the country changed its code after the burglary. The National Security Agency makes tape recordings of coded broadcasts from foreign embassies and keeps them on file so past transmission can be read if codes are broken.

The former agent said that

some of the burglaries were done primarily for "harassment purposes in retaliation for something that happened overseas." A lot of them were intended to be discovered." If a U.S. embassy in a foreign capital was burglarized, he explained, the CIA might do a similar break-in in Washington or New York to retaliate.

All agency trainees, he and other ex-CIA employees said, are given a primer briefing on how to conduct a burglary, the basic elements of breaking and entering. The actual technical skills are left to a small number of experts, including locksmiths, who are experienced at miniature photography, getting past alarm systems, and other techniques of espionage burglaries.

The former agent said he was not certain how far up the chain of command a proposal for burglary had to go for approval, but his impression was that during the 1960s a division chief could authorize a break-in. In recent years, he said, public controversy over the agency has required approval at a higher level.

"I don't want to leave the impression that these were frequent," the agent said. "They were rare." He did not attempt to estimate how many there were over the years.

CIA agents, according to the intelligence officer, also participated in surveillance of foreign nationals within the United States, including in New York City, where the U.S. government has formally assured foreign governments that it does not spy on U.N. diplomats. The FBI expends much more effort on this than the CIA, he added, partly because the FBI has the jurisdiction of protecting against foreign subversion within the United States and partly because the CIA has limited manpower for that task.

"I can remember situations in New York City where they wanted to surveil half a dozen people—not Americans—and they couldn't get the manpower," the agent said.

The former agent was not familiar with any spying on American citizens within the United States, though he noted that the CIA has made contact with "tens of thousands" of citizens who travel abroad, businessmen and scholars, among others, in order to gather information about foreign countries. All of these people are recorded in CIA files, the agent said, but that does not mean that any of them were ever under surveillance.

"There are files in the CIA that have tens of thousands of citizens' names on them," the agent said. "That fact is going to shock some people, but there's no reason why it should."

The reports of CIA involvement in domestic spying were given a retrospective note of

WASHINGTON POST

1 January 1975

Israel May Feel Impact

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

The forced resignation of James J. Angleton over allegations of illegal domestic Central Intelligence Agency operations may have an important impact on the agency's counter espionage and foreign intelligence operations, especially as they relate to Israel, informed sources said yesterday.

Angleton, who headed the CIA's counterintelligence division, personally handled exchanges of information with Israel, bypassing the established channels, a former intelligence officer confirmed yesterday.

Normally, counterespionage and intelligence information is sent from a regional desk at CIA to the ambassador and the agency station chief in a given country. These officials keep local intelligence services informed of intelligence relating to the security of that country. In many cases, the information involves threats of foreign subversion.

For a number of reasons, however, Israel was treated apart from the Middle East regional desk, and Angleton personally served as liaison with Israeli intelligence services.

Informed sources said this was partly due to the fact that Israel has an excellent counterintelligence service and had much information to share. Second, a former intelligence official said, there is a great deal of hostility in the world toward Israel and the agency sought to keep it segregated. Moreover, dealings with Israel are considered highly sensitive in the United States.

It has also been suggested that Angleton had a pro-Israeli bias, partly because he, as a staunch anti-Communist, looked upon Israel as a bastion against Soviet incursions in the Middle East. For this reason, he wanted to keep Israel separated from the CIA Middle East desk, which is largely staffed by Arabists who, by training and inclination, tend to favor the Arab viewpoint.

Although Israel may be expected to feel the first impact of the Angleton departure, intelligence sources said, there is bound to be dislocation in other areas.

In intelligence and counterespionage, these sources said, a great deal depends on the belief in the personal integrity of the officer. Angleton, these sources said, was respected as a cautious and careful counterintelligence expert who was sought out by foreign intelligence services. These foreign services were willing to share information because they could receive excellent intelligence from the United States.

"Because of Angleton," said one informant, "many foreign intelligence services maintained close liaison with the agency."

It was partly on such information that the CIA based its analyses, many of which have stood up well in the past. It is conceded that Angleton may have held anti-Communist biases of the Cold War variety, but it is stressed that he dealt only in raw intelligence and did not participate in drawing up the national intelligence estimates on which policy is based.

corroboration in testimony given by former White House counsel John W. Dean III to the Senate Watergate committee 18 months ago.

"My office," Dean testified, "received regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the FBI and, on some occasions, from the CIA." He was not drawn out on the point.

31 DEC 1974

Keeping the Crime Rate Under Constant Surveillance

By Art Buchwald

For some years now Washington, D.C., has had one of the highest robbery rates of any city in the country.

We always assumed the crimes were committed by the underprivileged, unemployed and disaffected members of the population. So you can imagine our surprise when all of us picked up The New York Times the other day and read that there was some evidence that the CIA had been involved in breaking and entering and other second-story jobs in the capital.

No one knows how many break-ins the CIA was involved in, but it certainly does pose a problem as far as our crime rate is concerned.

My friend, George Washington Custer, called me as soon as he read the story. "Hey, man," he said chortling. "You read where the CIA's been committing all the break-ins in our fair city?"

"The story didn't say that," I warned Custer. "It indicated that there was a possibility that the CIA may have been involved in some break-ins in the name of national security."

"What are they breaking into homes in Washington for? I thought they were supposed to spy on all those Communists in Russia."

"That's the point, Custer. In order to spy on Communists in the Soviet Union, it is sometimes necessary to break into people's homes in the United States. But I'm certain the CIA would not sneak into anybody's house unless they were certain they were friends of our enemies abroad."

"How would they know that?" Custer demanded.

"Because apparently the CIA kept a list of Americans that were suspect. They probably weren't per-

mitted to rob your house unless you were on the list."

"How come the CIA was allowed to do this?"

"They weren't," I said patiently. "But when you work for the CIA you can do a lot of things you are not allowed to do. That's why you operate in secret."

"Well, let me ask you this. Suppose half the break-ins in Washington were made by the CIA and only half were made by the common robber? How come they never caught the CIA fellows?"

"The CIA crook has much better training for breaking and entering than the average man in the street. For one thing, he's a college graduate."

"Well, let me ask you another question. If the CIA is involved in a breaking-and-entering job, does that make it a street crime or a white-collar crime?"

"That's a good question, Custer. Why do you ask?"

"If it's a white-collar crime and it's been listed as a street crime, then maybe Washington's been taking a bum rap. How do we know the biggest crimes in this city have not been committed by the government?"

"The biggest crimes in any city are always committed by the government, Custer. You should know that."

"It still bothers me. Going into someone's home through a window sounds like something the White House would do—not the CIA."

"Maybe," I said, "but let me ask you this. What would you do if you had all those people working for you out in Virginia and you could only afford to send a certain number of them abroad? Wouldn't you tell them to go out and break into a home in Washington?"

"But why?" he asked.

"Practice, Custer, practice."

BALTIMORE SUN
31 December 1974

CIA: Sinned Against or Sinning?

It is fortuitous yet fitting that congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency are gearing up just as the Watergate trial is winding down. During the series of revelations that finally crushed the Nixon administration, the CIA often was depicted as being more sinned upon than sinning. It was the CIA that provided disguises and other paraphernalia used by White House "plumbers" in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in 1971. It was the CIA that was urged by the Nixon White House to limit FBI probes of the Watergate break-in a year later and to provide what amounted to hush money for the former CIA operatives involved.

In both instances, the CIA was said to have drawn back after becoming momentarily involved in illegal activities as a result of White House pressure. Mindful that its mandates precludes its exercising "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or international security functions" within the boundaries of the United States, the CIA in both cases supposedly avoided being compromised —though only just.

If true, this was a somewhat reassuring state of the affairs. The Nixon administration, after all, was only a passing phenomenon. But the CIA was an enduring, covertly financed agency, and if it was

really sticking to foreign intelligence operations and staying out of domestic matters the nation's democratic institutions would be the better for it.

The Watergate and Ellsberg revelations called attention to the abuse and misuse of the CIA in only two highly publicized instances. But together with disclosures of Mr. Nixon's interest in a special intelligence units completely outside legal channels, they were bound to raise questions whether transgressions of basic civil rights were more widespread. The New York Times has reported that the CIA kept dossiers on 10,000 Americans and, more seriously, engaged in repeated instances of breaking and entering and in wiretapping U.S. citizens within the boundaries of the United States. Senator William Proxmire has stated he has corroborative information to this effect. The agency appears to have concentrated its effort on the very anti-war activists that caused paranoia in the Nixon White House.

As trials against the men who aided and abetted Mr. Nixon's illegalities come to an end, it is mandatory that Congress and the Department of Justice look thoroughly into the operations of the CIA. The country has just gotten rid of a corrupt administration. Now we must be sure that some of this corruption is not permitted to linger in the most powerful and sensitive of government institutions.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 JANUARY 1975

C.I.A. in '68 Gave Secret Service a Report Containing Gossip About Eartha Kitt After White House Incident

By SEYMOUR HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2—The Central Intelligence Agency, asked by the Secret Service in 1968 about Eartha Kitt, produced an extensive report containing second-hand gossip about the entertainer but no evidence of any foreign intelligence connections, a copy of the report showed today.

The report, supplied a week after Miss Kitt criticized the Vietnam war at a White House luncheon during the Johnson Administration, shows that the C.I.A. had been collecting raw and unevaluated data on her at least since 1956, eight years after she began appearing professionally in Europe and the United States.

The C.I.A. report on Miss Kitt, which has been obtained by The New York Times, includes information about her from "confidential" sources in Paris and in New York City.

Under the 1947 National Security Act setting up the C.I.A., the agency was barred from any domestic police or internal security functions. The agency's Counterintelligence Division, however, has traditionally been responsible for monitoring the activities of Americans overseas who were suspected of being involved with foreign intelligence operatives.

Files on Radicals

It could not be learned whether the C.I.A. report on Miss Kitt was related in any way to the files that the agency reportedly maintained on anti-war radicals and other dissidents in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies.

The New York Times quoting informed sources reported on Dec. 22 that 10,000 files were maintained on dissidents until the practice was discovered in 1973 by James R. Schlesinger, then the C.I.A. director. In addition, The Times reported that illegal break-ins, wiretaps and mail inspections were conducted by the agency inside the United States beginning as long as 20 years ago.

The 1968 report supplied to the White House by the C.I.A. contains no information to suggest that Miss Kitt had any personal or other contact with foreign agents while entertaining overseas. She did dance briefly, according to the report, at the age of 20 with a dancing group whose lead was said to have "served as a sponsor or endorser of a number of Communist-front activities" in 1948.

The report further showed, however, that she left the dancing group shortly thereafter to begin singing in Paris and elsewhere in Europe, and eventually returned to become a successful performer in the United States.

The three-page single-spaced report, which included a C.I.A. warning about the "sensitive nature of this information,"

then quoted a confidential source as saying in 1956 that "her escapades overseas and her loose morals were said to be the talk of Paris." She was depicted in the C.I.A. document as having "a very nasty disposition," and as "being a spoiled child, very crude and having a vile tongue." Miss Kitt, who is black, was said not to associate with other Negroes and "often bragged that she had very little Negro blood."

Support for Dr. King

A few paragraphs later, however, the report noted that in 1960 Miss K had signed an advertisement in support of the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights drive in the South. Other signers of the advertisement the C.I.A. report noted, included "a number of persons identified in the past with the Communist party."

A spokesman for the C.I.A., asked about the agency's 1,100-work report on Miss Kitt, said, "I'm not going to discuss the matter with you, sir."

Pressed, the spokesman added, "that is the extent of what I'm saying." Miss Kitt, reached by telephone today at her home in Beverly Hills, Calif., said, "I don't understand this at all. I think it's disgusting."

The entertainer said The Times could publish as much of the C.I.A. report as it saw fit, adding, "I've always lived a very clean life and I have nothing to be afraid of and I have nothing to hide."

Inaccuracies Noted

The entertainer said that most of the statements about her childhood and career, as recorded in the C.I.A. document, were incorrect. "As long as they're going to investigate any of us," she said caustically, "they should at least come out with the truth."

A number of well-informed Hollywood sources, queried today about Miss Kitt, described her as being—as one put it—"not political at all."

"She was political in the sense that she was in favor of civil rights," this person said.

The inquiry into Miss Kitt originated after she shouted angrily at Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson during a luncheon on Jan. 18, 1968, that the nation's youth were rebelling because they were being "snatched off to be shot in Vietnam." The remark visibly shocked Mrs. Johnson and angered the President.

Secret Service sources acknowledged that the inquiry into Miss Kitt's background and any possible threat to the President and others under Secret Service protection was initiated the next day.

The Times obtained the report on Miss Kitt from Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist who obtained it.

November, 1972, and later wrote a column—without identifying Miss Kitt—about the C.I.A. intelligence.

At the time, however, Mr. Anderson wrote that "we have confirmed that the C.I.A. doesn't keep files on American citizens, except for security files on its own personnel."

Mr. Anderson said in a telephone conversation today that he had discussed the file on Miss Kitt with Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence, who he said "insisted that this was not typical."

"He said it was kept only because she had become involved overseas with people in whom

the C.I.A. had legitimate interest," Mr. Anderson said.

"We discussed other things," Mr. Anderson said of his conversation with Mr. Helms, who is now the Ambassador to Iran, "and he spoke with such candor that I wound up believing almost everything he told me."

Prof. Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University, considered an expert on the C.I.A. and its legal authority, said in a telephone interview today that the reporting on Miss Kitt contained in the C.I.A. document was—even if conducted entirely overseas—"extremely mischievous or worse, unwise and probably in violation of her rights."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

31 DEC 1974

**Jack
Mabley**

Watergate nearly got us

THE HIGH SPOT on those televised year-end reviews is the face of former President Richard Nixon saying, "I am not a crook" and "I will not resign" and "Let us put Watergate behind us."

These proclamations are much more interesting in the perspective of history than they were when first uttered.

A recurring phrase in the printed and visual examinations of this historic year is "the system works." This means that we have such a splendid system of government with so many built-in checks and balances that chicanery on the scale practiced by the Nixon people would inevitably be discovered, and the perpetrators brought to justice.

The system is functioning only 50 per cent with Mr. Nixon. He has been exposed, but intervention by his successor set aside the "brought to justice" part. However, our system has printed "In God We Trust" on every dollar bill in circulation; and it is suggested that God intervened when Mr. Ford and the system faltered.

MR. NIXON is suffering in his California purgatory, suffering far more than his lackeys who are in prison or standing trial. He seems to be under sentence of a slow and painful death.

Historians will revel in analyzing, dissecting and interpreting the incredible events of 1974. Justification of the intensity of their interest is

2 January 1975

in the warning that if we do not learn from history, we are doomed to repeat it.

I wonder if they aren't going to heap a lot of qualifications on the phrase of the moment, "the system works." Now we know the system almost didn't work; that we were extraordinarily lucky that the rascals had some bumbler in their midst whose stupidity provided the leverage to make the system work.

HERE'S MATERIAL for a nightmare:

Suppose that the Watergate burglar who taped the door latches open had been a little smarter and had not taped the door latches open, and the Watergate burglary had gone undetected.

Or suppose that the burglars had been caught, but that Richard Nixon had not bugged his offices and recorded the words that led to his doom. Or suppose that he had taken the advice, supposedly from Mrs. Nixon, that he burn all the tapes. He'd still be President.

In hypothesis No. 1, Ehrlichman and Haldeman would be running the White House under Nixon, along with Dean and Colson and all the gang. Their arrogance would be compounded because of their success in circumventing the law.

That former submarine captain would still be the head man in the FBI, taking orders from Haldeman's crew. The CIA would be strengthening its domestic surveillance and building up a computer file on citizens who dissented from the wisdom of the Nixon way.

THAT TRIAL balloon for a Constitutional amendment to allow Nixon to run for a third term could have become a full fledged national movement, stage-managed by the people who brought us the Committee to Re-elect the President.

If Nixon wasn't elected for another four years in 1976, his hand-picked man probably would win. Likely John Connally. It's doubtful that any Democratic candidate, no matter how decent or capable, could withstand an assault from CREEP, the dirty tricks gang who had cut their teeth on the 1972 contest.

The proposed law—even now being pushed by the CIA—to allow closed trials and unpublicized imprisonment of citizens who reveal information the CIA says should be secret—would likely become the law of the land.

We had a close call in 1974, system or no system. Go back 355 days and consider the scenario above, and what actually happened, and decide which could be more reasonably expected to take place.

State of the nations

CIA and FBI

By Joseph C. Harsch

The latest alleged disclosures about the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) sound exaggerated to us and we await with interest what congressional exploration of the matter will unearth, if anything. But the fact that the CIA is accused (by no means yet convicted) of having indulged in massive surveillance of American citizens inside the confines of the United States during the Nixon administration makes it timely to remind ourselves of why Americans have both a CIA and an FBI.

At the end of World War II an important pending question was what to do with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). It was a war baby, regarded at the time as a temporary, wartime operation. It had a brilliant war record under the leadership of "Wild Bill" Donovan who had first earned fame as colonel of the New York's famed "Fighting Irish" regiment (the old 69th) in World War I.

The decision was taken to establish a continuing and permanent intelligence gathering organization in Washington, and then one of the great internal struggles of Washington began.

J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI proposed that all such work be consolidated inside his own organization. Colonel, by then Major General, Donovan went to the figurative mat. It was a story largely unreported. The battle was fought mostly out of public view.

Up to that time there had been a galaxy of federal investigative agencies. The Secret Service and the Corps of Postal Inspectors were entirely independent of the FBI, and proud of it. Mr. Hoover wanted it all under one roof and one head. General Donovan argued up and down Pennsylvania Avenue, through the corridors of Congress and with every reporter he could get to listen to him that a single federal police service would be the long first step to a gestapo. He believed and fervently preached the

doctrine of the separation of federal police activities. His motto: in diversity, safety.

"Bill" Donovan won that battle. It was probably the toughest fight of his life. He would be pleased to know that there is today what he would regard as a healthy and lively rivalry between the FBI and the CIA. And it wouldn't bother him a bit to hear that the CIA has allegedly been poaching on FBI territory.

The settlement or truce of 1947 which ended the struggle took the form of legislation under which the FBI was restricted to domestic investigation and surveillance and the CIA was set up to handle overseas operations. In theory the FBI never leaves American shores and the CIA never comes home. In practice each has poached. The FBI has long since set up offices in most important foreign cities — "in order to follow American cases which go overseas." And the CIA has, understandably, been interested in Americans who are in touch with suspicious foreigners. The CIA admits frankly that it has a lot of American names in its files.

The fact that Congress is now looking into the question of whether the CIA dangerously exceeded its mandate during the Nixon years will perhaps have a salutary effect on both agencies. The boundary between their activities can well be freshly repainted on their maps and both teams can be reminded usefully of the limits of their respective jurisdictions. Americans need both a domestic and an overseas intelligence gathering agency. They also need a Secret Service. Thanks to General Donovan the three still exist independently of each other.

"Wild Bill" was the most decorated American field officer of World War I. He deserved something very special for valor in that unseen battle on the Potomac in 1947 when he saw to it that there was not to be a single, integrated, federal investigative service.

WASHINGTON POST
3 January 1975

Former CIA-FBI Liaison Man Sees Operational 'Gray Areas'

By Ronald Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The former liaison man between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said yesterday that the statutory restriction against CIA domestic activity is impossible to follow.

Sam Papich, who was the FBI's liaison man with the CIA for 18 years until he retired in 1970, cited what he called "gray areas" where the CIA has crossed into domestic operations for what he said were legitimate reasons.

Papich, who said he dealt with these crossovers on a daily basis, blamed confusion about the CIA's role on what he called a statute that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous."

A former CIA attorney acknowledged yesterday that the 1957 statute establishing the CIA has "gray areas," but he said many examples of CIA domestic activity cited over the years have been both legal and proper.

For example, he said, a CIA training program for local police departments was widely thought to have been aimed at antiwar activists and therefore represented an incursion into the domestic field.

In fact, said the former CIA official, who said he approved the program at the time, its purpose was to share with local police several devices and methods the CIA had developed in its own work.

The device, he said, aids in the apprehension of murderers by detecting whether a suspect has held a piece of metal in the past 24 hours.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who heads a congressional committee with oversight powers over the CIA, suggested when he was informed of the program that it should have been carried out by the FBI, the former CIA attorney said. But he said the program did not violate the CIA charter.

The charter says the CIA shall have "no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." But it also says the CIA director is "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." And it charges the agency with performing "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Agency may from time to time direct."

Papich said areas where the CIA became involved in do-

mestic matters included dealing with Americans approached by Soviet agents, Soviet visitors and spies in the United States, and Americans who work for the CIA or apply for jobs there.

In these and other areas, Papich said, the CIA and FBI functions appeared to overlap, and informal guidelines had been developed for handling the situations.

In a typical year, Papich said, some 2,000 Americans are approached by Soviet agents either in this country or overseas in an attempt to convert them into spies.

"If you get a report that Mollie Brown while she was in Moscow was approached, what do you do? Nine times out of 10 she's a good girl, but maybe naive, and nothing happened."

But background checks will be made on her, and a file could be opened at CIA headquarters because the CIA originally discovered that she had been contacted, Papich said.

"Hundreds of defectors come to this country from Soviet countries," said Papich, who heads a New Mexico organized crime commission. "There was a procedure for processing them. Who is going to be responsible for settling them? Many are neurotic, misfits — they have to be wet-nursed. Is he for real? The CIA had to stay on top of them. If they had problems, they had to get them straightened out."

In addition, Papich said, the CIA cultivated foreigners living in this country to obtain information on their homelands.

"The CIA would handle Cuban nationals here to get information on Soviet missiles in Cuba," he said. Such work might also be handled by the FBI with CIA assistance.

"Maybe he [the FBI agent handling a case] has never been abroad. It would only be logical to bring in a CIA expert," he said.

The CIA handled its own security, Papich said, and this is another area where the agency becomes involved in checking the backgrounds of American citizens.

"They had their own offices of security," he said. "What they did to protect them we never got involved in, except when it appeared an employee had violated the law." In policing its own employees, Papich said, the CIA would require wiretaps if it had found a possible Soviet spy within the agency.

Often, Papich said, delays occurred when authority for a particular operation was being

transferred from the CIA to the FBI.

"A Soviet spy in France out of the blue travels to the U.S.," he said. "You don't just pick up the phone and tell Hoover. It might take a week to three months. The FBI people have to become acclimated [to the subject]. Let's say the CIA knows a double agent who is a source. You don't automatically turn him over to the FBI. He might not want to deal with the FBI. You might get them [the CIA] operating for six months in the U.S."

Papich said the CIA is accused of interfering in U.S. domestic activities when it seeks help for overseas work from universities. "A fellow goes to XYZ university and contacts a professor to write an article that will be planted overseas," he said. "It never runs smoothly. We [the United States] weren't cut out for it."

In addition, he said, the CIA often helped the FBI to keep an eye on Soviets visiting the United States or employed here.

"They always had one or two KGB [Soviet intelligence] agents in the group," he said. "The CIA would have an interest. They had the benefit of experience overseas."

While allowing that some abuses might have occurred, Papich said, "My feeling is some of the surveillances were misunderstood." He added, "We need time out to assess this thing in a cool, rational way to determine if the statute should be changed in light of what we want from an intelligence agency."

NEW YORK TIMES
2 JANUARY 1975

Who Else Is Guilty?

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Jan. 1—"Four out of five guilty!" shouted the man on the desk in the newsroom, as the bottom fell out of the lives of John Mitchell, Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Robert Mardian.

The Appeals Courts will determine whether justice triumphed in the Watergate cover-up trial, or whether truth triumphed at the expense of justice. But the decision of the nine women and three men puts the seal of finality on the seamiest episode of our time.

When Mr. Average Man pronounced the verdict of guilty on four formerly powerful men, the reaction of other average people was that they must have deserved it, and thank God it's all over.

But it's not over. Up to now, inquiry into the unlawful use of the law has centered on Watergate and its aftermath, but the investigation of the abuse of power has only just begun. Guilt is guilt, and it is not lessened by an examination of "root causes":

ESSAY

however, today's verdict—significantly, on the first day of the final quarter century of this millennium—marks the end of Watergate and the beginning of a broader self-examination.

The forthcoming exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency also has to do with the unlawful use of the law. When The New York Times recently blew the lid off C.I.A. domestic activity, a headline writer automatically narrowed the wrongdoings to "the Nixon years," but we are coming to see that these illegal practices began well before that.

During the Watergate investigation, Charles Colson put forward a theory that the C.I.A. had more to do with Watergate than met the F.B.I. This was ignored; even when Senator Howard Baker issued a report detailing the curious coincidences of C.I.A. involvement, the idea was resisted as somehow taking the blame away from then-President Nixon.

Now, a year after his testimony was taken in secret by the Senate Watergate Committee, we see that Howard Hunt was in a C.I.A. unit that spied on Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign. Why was this testimony suppressed — "covered up" — for a year? What other useful information about the unlawful use of the law has been put on ice to protect us from distraction until the Nixon men were jailed?

Perhaps now a Congressional committee will look into the surveillance of newsmen by L.B.J.'s Marvin Watson, hinted at and hushed up at the House Judiciary Inquiry. Perhaps the

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American Civil Liberties Union will volunteer to represent Mrs. Martin Luther King Jr. in a lawsuit against the F.B.I. for illegally wiretapping her late husband.

For the Office of the Special Prosecutor, these are the days of Jill Wine and roses, with the acquittal of Kenneth Parkinson the lone exception in an otherwise perfect record. Even Harry Dent was forced to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, and the indictment of some Hubert Humphrey aides has helped present a nicely nonpartisan image. But soon some hard questions will be asked, and not by diehards or partisans.

How can we account for the sweetheart relationship that appears to exist between the special prosecution force and the F.B.I.? L. Patrick Gray, a fine and patriotic man, has reportedly admitted destroying evidence during the cover-up. Why has the former F.B.I. chief not been prosecuted? Probably because Pat Gray could blow the whistle on a dozen top agents of the F.B.I., requiring trials on a variety of crimes and generally lowering morale.

Another example: William Sullivan, a former high F.B.I. official, has not been placed under oath and asked the kind of question that might embarrass F.B.I. men currently in office, or might conflict with sworn testimony of our supreme commander in Europe. Mr. Sullivan has been unwell, but the reason he has not been called is that the special prosecutor does not want to get into sticky areas of "bag jobs" and political spying.

On those same lines, Cartha DeLoach, a close aide to the late J. Edgar Hoover, has not been asked under oath about the wiretapping of Anna Chennault in 1968, and of the subsequent illegal F.B.I. intrusion in the U.S. political process in that year's election campaign. But the law enforcement establishment, of which the special prosecution force is a part, does not want to foul its own nest.

Perhaps the nation's interest in the unlawful use of the law will wane with the satisfying clank of prison gates behind the four men pronounced guilty today. I hope not. Revelation of embryonic activity in the sixties does not extenuate crimes of more recent vintage, but they will show us how pervasive and dangerous our unconcern has been.

No vendetta is needed, no "getting even" by besmirching dead men's reputations, no prison sentences for lawmen who operated in the approved context of their times. But needed after today's verdict of guilty is a searching look at who else was guilty, what set the pattern for the excesses being paid for today, so that we can gain an understanding of why some upright men go wrong.

Probing the CIA

The proposal that President Ford establish a special panel to investigate the CIA is an excellent one. Such a recommendation reportedly has been made by Henry Kissinger and others with a view to reviewing the recent allegations of massive and illegal domestic spying by the agency and helping damp down the controversy.

So far the President has ordered a report on the CIA and informed the agency that he will not tolerate any intelligence operation in the United States in violation of its charter. The establishment of an independent commission would serve notice that the administration means to be responsible for its own house, to police it — and to reform it if necessary.

American public trust in the CIA cannot be assured now until there is a full accounting of Watergate-related conduct as well as of the alleged use of agents to monitor political dissidents.

It should be repeated that the allegations against the CIA are still only broadly stated, although disturbing detail is beginning to emerge. Time magazine now reports that among those who were under CIA surveillance were Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, a senator, and two representatives. And the New York Times cites an ex-CIA agent telling of an underground spying operation on radical groups in various American cities at the height of the antiwar activities.

We would have the panel do more than scrutinize only these explosive charges, however. For years now the CIA has come under increasing public criticism, most recently because of its in-

volve ment in trying to subvert the government of Chile. The panel should therefore consider charges by some that the CIA is overstaffed, overfunded, and out of step with new realities of foreign policy. Some of its many clandestine activities may need pruning. Its broad function and purpose need redefinition, as does the term "national security."

Many questions could be asked in this connection. Should the CIA be prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations? Should its work be restricted to intelligence gathering? Where it overstepped its charter, who was at fault? Should there be tighter control of the CIA?

In short, it is time to reappraise the agency, and a blue-ribbon panel could set about this task. Needless to say, it would be extremely important that its members be fully independent and free from any loyalties to the administration or political ambitions. It could draw on judges, scholars, scientists, diplomats, and the business community.

While scrutiny of the CIA goes on, we hope Americans will not automatically and prematurely condemn an agency whose work by its very nature is unpleasant but needful. At the same time they should require that the CIA measure up to the highest standards of usefulness and probity. As director William Colby has said, "We in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be an intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations."